

## Russia to fully de-dollarise its sovereign fund - with little implication for the market

Russia announced a full de-dollarisation of the National Wealth Fund, which means selling US\$40 bn in favour of gold, yuan, and euro. This will be done internally between the government and Bank of Russia. A further accumulation of FX as per the fiscal rule will continue to involve USD on the local market with subsequent conversion on external markets



Today, the Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov announced that Russia will [fully de-dollarise](#) the National Wealth Fund (sovereign fund), converting its remaining US\$40 bn into Chinese yuan, gold, and euro within a month's time. The share of USD will drop from 35% to zero, while euro will go up to 40%, Chinese yuan to 30% and gold to 20%. While the ruble initially reacted positively to the news, we believe it to be neutral.

- The de-dollarisation is unlikely to involve any open market transactions. With the NWF essentially being an FX deposit with the central bank, the entire deal can be

covered by the central bank's international reserves, which are larger and more diversified than the NWF (Figure 1). In order to reach the targeted FX structure, the Ministry of Finance has to sell US\$40 bn and GBP4 bn, exchanging them for US\$23 bn equivalent of gold, US\$18 bn equivalent of CNY and US\$5bn equivalent of EUR. As of the end of 3Q20 (latest available disclosure date) the Central Bank of Russia had EUR143 bn, US\$71 bn equivalent of CNY, and US\$137 bn equivalent of gold.

- We do not believe that MinFin's move to ditch the USD (apparently done in order to reduce exposure to foreign policy risks) will necessarily trigger de-dollarisation of CBR reserves (which would require external open market transaction). As of the latest available disclosure date, the CBR had US\$127 bn of USD, or 22% of the total (Figure 2). First, according to international agreements, central banks are less exposed to sanction risks than governments, lowering the urgency to fully de-dollarise. Second, compared to other macro [parameters](#), the share of USD in the Russian central bank's international assets already appears low vs. around 60% in Russian exports, 40% in Russian imports, 60% in Russian foreign debt, 45-65% in Russian international private assets, and 60% in global international reserves.
- As of current FX purchases (a further note will be released on this today), we doubt the local FX market has the capacity to directly accommodate the new MinFin structure. Local FX market turnover as of 2020 (Figure 3) was still dominated by USD (87%) with the rest being mostly EUR. In order to mirror the MinFin's FX purchases, the CBR is likely to rely on USD and EUR on the local market, subsequently using external markets to convert it into the assets actually required by MinFin.

**Figure 1: The Bank of Russia has an ample and diversified asset structure to accommodate MinFin's needs**






Figure 2: USD accounts for around 20% of the CBR reserves



Source: Bank of Russia, ING

Figure 3: Local FX market allows CBR to buy only USD and EUR



Source: Bank of Russia, ING

## Author

**Dmitry Dolgin**

Chief Economist, CIS

[dmitry.dolgin@ing.de](mailto:dmitry.dolgin@ing.de)

## Disclaimer

This publication has been prepared by the Economic and Financial Analysis Division of ING Bank N.V. ("ING") solely for information purposes without regard to any particular user's investment objectives, financial situation, or means. *ING forms part of ING Group (being for this purpose ING Group N.V. and its subsidiary and affiliated companies).* The information in the publication is not an investment recommendation and it is not investment, legal or tax advice or an offer or solicitation to purchase or sell any financial instrument. Reasonable care has been taken to ensure that this publication is not untrue or misleading when published, but ING does not represent that it is accurate or complete. ING does not accept any liability for any direct, indirect or consequential loss arising from any use of this publication. Unless otherwise stated, any views, forecasts, or estimates are solely those of the author(s), as of the date of the publication and are subject to change without notice.

The distribution of this publication may be restricted by law or regulation in different jurisdictions and persons into whose

possession this publication comes should inform themselves about, and observe, such restrictions.

Copyright and database rights protection exists in this report and it may not be reproduced, distributed or published by any person for any purpose without the prior express consent of ING. All rights are reserved. ING Bank N.V. is authorised by the Dutch Central Bank and supervised by the European Central Bank (ECB), the Dutch Central Bank (DNB) and the Dutch Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM). ING Bank N.V. is incorporated in the Netherlands (Trade Register no. 33031431 Amsterdam). In the United Kingdom this information is approved and/or communicated by ING Bank N.V., London Branch. ING Bank N.V., London Branch is authorised by the Prudential Regulation Authority and is subject to regulation by the Financial Conduct Authority and limited regulation by the Prudential Regulation Authority. ING Bank N.V., London branch is registered in England (Registration number BR000341) at 8-10 Moorgate, London EC2 6DA. For US Investors: Any person wishing to discuss this report or effect transactions in any security discussed herein should contact ING Financial Markets LLC, which is a member of the NYSE, FINRA and SIPC and part of ING, and which has accepted responsibility for the distribution of this report in the United States under applicable requirements.

Additional information is available on request. For more information about ING Group, please visit <http://www.ing.com>.