

Global Economic Outlook: Trump's Trade Gamble

Our monthly economic outlook for July is dominated by the uncertainty created by President Trump's moves on tariffs and trade. There's limited evidence that protectionist measures are derailing global growth so far but risks are skewed to the downside over the summer

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Uncertainty from President Trump's economic pronouncements could be more dangerous for the global economy than the direct impact on trade



The downside risks for market and boardroom sentiment

Our monthly economic outlook for July is dominated by the uncertainty created by Donald Trump's moves on tariffs and trade. The President vowed to "Make America Great Again" and a strong economy with low unemployment has been achieved. This success has emboldened him to push harder on trade. Although the EU and the US are still exploring possible solutions, business is braced for a step-up in protectionist policies over the summer. The uncertainty such behaviour generates implies downside risk for financial market and boardroom sentiment. This could be even more dangerous for the global economy than the direct impact on trade.

There is limited evidence so far that protectionist measures are derailing the global economy, but growth risks are skewed towards the downside over the summer. The coming months could see \$600bn of trade hit with tit-for-tat tariffs between the US and China. Worse for Europe, there is also the possibility that auto imports to the US will also attract tariffs of around 20%.

The wider perspective

On their own, we are probably talking an impact measured in only one or two-tenths of a percentage point on global growth. However, the impact on financial markets and economic confidence may be much larger and lead to a more substantial slowdown in activity. Steep equity market falls and a downturn in investment and job creation could trigger a greater willingness to compromise. However, we doubt President Trump will change tack before the 6 November mid-term elections. His personal approval ratings have been trending higher and there has been some evidence of Republicans doing a little better in the polling. Nonetheless, right now the Republicans look set to lose control of Congress, which could open the door to an eventual shift in policy.

The fiscal and monetary situation

The US economy itself is performing well. 2Q GDP growth is likely to come in at around 4%, while inflation is set to rise above 3% in the next couple of months. With unemployment at 50-year lows, the Federal Reserve will stick to its "gradual" policy tightening of one hike per quarter, but the trade-related drags on activity will slow the pace of hikes next year. Trade war fears and financial deleveraging reform pose clear downside risks to Chinese growth. However, we are now seeing both fiscal and monetary policy loosening from authorities. The People's Bank of China has ceased rate hikes and has cut reserve requirement ratios, while government spending is picking up. At the same time, the currency is weakening under market forces, which should all help to limit the damage.

Under the surface of falling sentiment indicators, political tensions in several countries and trade war fears, the Eurozone economy is continuing its solid recovery. As a result, the European Central Bank (ECB) can bring its quantitative easing (QE) programme to an end this year, but interest rates will likely be left unchanged for at least another year. Japan is not growing as fast as it was, and will not be immune to a looming global trade slowdown. But the domestic economy is looking a little more robust than for some time, and this could help provide some offset to a poorer export backdrop.

A dangerous cocktail in FX markets

FX markets continue to be governed by trade tensions and firm US interest rates. This is a dangerous cocktail for emerging markets as an asset class and supportive for the dollar in general. Risks to our EUR/USD forecasts are firmly skewed to the downside.

ING global forecasts

	FIRST QUARTER	2017				2018F				2019F				2020F							
		2Q	3Q	4Q	FY	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	FY	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	FY	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	FY	
United States																					
GDP (% QoQ, ann)		1.2	3.1	3.2	2.9	2.3	2.0	4.0	3.3	2.3	2.9	1.5	2.2	2.0	1.9	2.2	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.8
CPI headline (% YoY)		2.6	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.3	2.7	2.9	2.6	2.6	2.3	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.1	1.9	2.1
Federal Funds (% eop) ¹		0.75	1.00	1.00	1.25		1.50	1.75	2.00	2.25		2.50	2.50	2.75	2.75		3.00	3.25	3.25	3.00	
3-month interest rate (% eop)		1.15	1.30	1.33	1.56		2.30	2.35	2.62	2.84		3.04	2.99	3.27	3.30		3.55	3.72	3.54	3.46	
10-year interest rate (% eop)		2.40	2.30	2.30	2.40		3.00	3.00	3.00	3.20		3.30	3.20	3.20	3.20		3.20	3.10	3.00	2.90	
Fiscal balance (% of GDP)					-3.5					-4.0					-4.7					-5.0	
Fiscal thrust (% of GDP)					0.0					1.4					0.8					0.4	
Debt held by public (% of GDP)					76.1					77.3					79.8					83.0	
Eurozone																					
GDP (% QoQ, ann)		2.7	3.0	2.9	2.8	2.4	1.5	1.5	1.7	1.6	2.0	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.2	0.9	1.6
CPI headline (% YoY)		1.5	1.3	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.7	2.0	1.6	1.7	1.4	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7
Refi minimum bid rate (% eop)		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	
3-month interest rate (% eop)		-0.33	-0.33	-0.33	-0.33		-0.33	-0.33	-0.33	-0.33		-0.25	-0.20	-0.10	0.10	0.10	0.15	0.30	0.40	0.50	0.50
10-year interest rate (% eop)		0.45	0.40	0.45	0.42		0.50	0.30	0.40	0.50		0.60	0.70	0.70	0.80	0.80	0.90	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Fiscal balance (% of GDP)					-0.9					-0.9					-1.1					-1.0	
Fiscal thrust (% of GDP)					0.2					0.2					0.3					0.1	
Gross public debt/GDP (%)					89.2					87.7					86.1					85.1	
Japan																					
GDP (% QoQ, ann)		1.9	2.3	1.6	1.3	1.7	-0.6	1.8	1.9	1.0	1.0	6.1	-7.8	1.2	1.4	0.7	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	0.6
CPI headline (% YoY)		0.2	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.5	1.3	0.7	1.0	0.6	0.9	0.6	2.2	2.2	2.3	1.8	2.3	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
Excess reserve rate (%)		-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1		-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1		-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	0.0		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
3-month interest rate (% eop)		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.0	0.0	0.05	0.1		0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	
10-year interest rate (% eop)		0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10		0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10		0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1		0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	
Fiscal balance (% of GDP)					-4.8					-4.1					-3.6					-3.0	
Gross public debt/GDP (%)					221.0					223.0					224.0					226.0	
China																					
GDP (% YoY)		6.9	6.9	6.8	6.8	6.9	6.8	6.7	6.7	6.8	6.8	6.7	6.7	6.6	6.6	6.7	6.6	6.5	6.5	6.4	6.5
CPI headline (% YoY)		1.4	1.4	1.6	1.8	1.6	2.5	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.2	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.0	1.9	2.0	1.9	1.8	1.7	2.0
PBOC 7-day reverse repo rate (% eop)		2.45	2.45	2.45	2.50		2.55	2.55	2.55	2.55	2.55	2.55	2.60	2.65	2.70	2.70	2.70	2.70	2.70	2.75	2.75
10-year T-bond yield (% eop)		3.29	3.57	3.61	3.90		3.75	3.54	3.50	3.40	3.40	3.30	3.20	3.10	3.00	3.00	3.00	2.95	2.95	2.90	2.90
Fiscal balance (% of GDP)					-3.7					-3.5					-3.5					-3.5	
Public debt, inc local govt (% GDP)					50.0					85.0					100					100	
UK																					
GDP (% QoQ, ann)		1.3	1.0	1.9	1.6	1.5	0.9	1.9	1.5	1.8		1.5	1.4	2.3	1.7		2.1	1.7	1.7	1.7	
CPI headline (% YoY)		2.1	2.7	2.8	3.0	2.7	2.7	2.5	2.5	2.3	2.5	2.2	2.1	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.2
BoE official bank rate (% eop)		0.25	0.25	0.25	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.25	1.25	1.50	1.50	1.50
BoE Quantitative Easing (Ebn)		445	445	445	445		445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445
3-month interest rate (% eop)		0.35	0.35	0.35	0.52		0.60	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.85	1.05	1.05	1.05	1.05	1.30	1.35	1.60	1.65	1.65
10-year interest rate (% eop)		1.15	1.10	1.35	1.20		1.45	1.48	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2
Fiscal balance (% of GDP)					-2.5					-1.8					-1.7					-1.4	
Fiscal thrust (% of GDP)					-0.5					-0.4					-0.4					-0.3	
Gross public debt/GDP (%)					87.0					86.5					86.0					85.5	
EUR/USD (eop)		1.08	1.12	1.20	1.20		1.25	1.17	1.17	1.23		1.25	1.30	1.33	1.35		1.36	1.37	1.38	1.40	
USD/JPY (eop)		112	115	110	113		107	110	110	110		108	105	102	100		98.0	95.0	93.0	90.0	
USD/CNY (eop)		6.89	6.78	6.65	6.51		6.28	6.67	6.80	7.00		7.00	6.80	6.60	6.50		6.5	6.4	6.4	6.3	
EUR/GBP (eop)		0.87	0.88	0.94	0.89		0.88	0.88	0.88	0.86		0.83	0.82	0.81	0.80		0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	
Brent Crude (US\$/bbl, avg)		55	51	52	61	55	67	72	70	68	69	64	66	67	66	66	61.0	66.0	71.0	66.0	66.0

¹Lower level of 25bp range; 3-month interest rate forecast based on interbank rates
Source: ING forecasts

Source: ING Global Research

[Click here to download our global forecasts](#)

Article | 6 July 2018

Eurozone: The ECB takes it slowly

After a strong 2017, political instability and trade tensions within the eurozone are pointing towards more moderate growth rates for 2018




Source: Shutterstock

The ECB is looking through mixed messages on the economy

Political tensions have ebbed away, at least for the time being. The eurozone is back to what it does best: muddling through. At the same time, the mist of weakening soft indicators and solid hard data is thickening. While this has increased downside risks for the growth outlook, it did not prevent the ECB from taking a huge step towards the end of quantitative easing (QE).

Economic data released over the last few weeks still leaves policymakers and forecasters a bit in the dark. How strong is the eurozone recovery? As 2017 ended at record highs, with almost endless upward revisions of growth forecasts and a general feeling of euphoria, the middle of 2018 has seen diminished expectations, dented enthusiasm and even concerns about the beginning of the end. The gradual decline of confidence indicators since the start of the year as well as erratic and often disappointing hard data contributed to increased nervousness about the state of the eurozone economy. Soft patch, severe downswing or simply the transition towards normalisation? What is it?

Limits to production



Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream

We believe the eurozone is transitioning towards moderate growth rates

In our base case scenario, the eurozone economy is neither on top of the world nor in the depths of despair. It is simply in a transition period towards more moderate growth rates. Despite the gradual decline since the start of the year, the absolute levels of confidence indicators remain high and point to continued solid growth. At the same time, sound domestic fundamentals, low interest rates and the renewed weakening of the euro exchange rate should support the eurozone recovery in the coming months. In fact, there could even be some positive surprises, simply given that expectations have dropped so sharply over the last six months. The bar to a positive surprise has clearly been lowered.

Unfortunately, the downside risks to the growth outlook have increased in recent months. Political tensions in several eurozone countries, fading efforts to further reform the monetary union and trade tensions are the three most prominent potential risk factors.

Politics at centre stage with Italy in the spotlight

Political tensions in Italy and Germany have clearly spooked financial markets. However, the latest developments point to typical European solutions to these tensions: a fudge, soothing short-term fears without fully taking away long-term concerns.

In Italy, the new government has so far avoided a collision course with Europe on fiscal and economic policies. The coalition partners seem to agree on at least keeping the nominal fiscal deficit below 3% of GDP in the coming years. Finance Minister Giovanni Tria suggested that the structural fiscal deficit would not worsen significantly in the near term. At the same time, however, let's not forget that Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte had already promised to implement both a flat tax of two rates and a guaranteed income of €780 per month. It remains to be seen how these two measures can be moulded into a budget plan which stays within the boundaries of Europe's fiscal rules. Here, things could heat up again after the summer.

Migration continues to dominate German politics


In Germany, the tensions on how to deal with migrants almost led to a collapse of the government. Even though Chancellor Angela Merkel made first steps towards a European solution at the last European Summit, the Bavarian sister party CSU pushed for more concessions. By announcing possible transit zones for asylum seekers, the German government seems to have avoided a full-fledged government crisis. However, trust within the government has taken a severe hit and tensions could easily flare up again at any time, on almost any topic.

The political instability in Germany will make it even harder for eurozone leaders to agree on anything substantial with respect to further eurozone reforms any time soon. While France and Germany seem to have found some common ground, even including a budget line for the eurozone, other governments are extremely reluctant to agree on anything that only remotely smells like transfers. Consequently, beyond making the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) a financial backstop for bank resolutions, it is hard to see how the eurozone will become more integrated in the coming years.

Trade tensions increase our nervousness on the economic outlook

Finally, a further escalation of the trade tensions hangs like a Damocles sword over the growth outlook for the eurozone. Even though the direct impact from a further escalation should be manageable (the Ifo institute estimates that 25% import tariffs on European cars could lower eurozone GDP by less than 0.1%) and even be offset by the weaker euro exchange rate, the pure impact on confidence could hit the eurozone already in the coming months.

Production and capacity utilisation



Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream

Nonetheless, the ECB seems intent on concluding its QE programme

Unless any of the above risks actually materialise into a tangible and significant downswing of the

economy, the ECB looks determined to bring its QE programme to a conclusion at the end of the year. The announcement after the June meeting that the ECB anticipates a lowering of the monthly purchases from €30 billion to €15 billion after September and an end of the net purchases in December delivered a very clear message.

At the same time, however, the ECB has started to put more emphasis on its forward guidance, stating that it expects interest rates “to remain at their present levels at least through the summer of 2019”. It is obvious that the ECB would like to return to interest rates, instead of QE, as the main policy instrument. Against the background of only a very gradual increase in core inflation and growth remaining close to, but probably below, potential, we expect the ECB to first hike the deposit rate and then the refi rate before the end of 2019. A very dovish ‘tapering’...

ING global forecasts

	2017					2018F					2019F					2020F					
	FIRST QUARTER	2Q	3Q	4Q	FY	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	FY	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	FY	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	FY	
United States																					
GDP (% QoQ, ann)	1.2	3.1	3.2	2.9	2.3	2.0	4.0	3.3	2.3	2.9	1.5	2.2	2.0	1.9	2.2	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.8	
CPI headline (% YoY)	2.6	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.3	2.7	2.9	2.6	2.6	2.3	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.1	1.9	2.1	
Federal Funds (% eop) ¹	0.75	1.00	1.00	1.25	1.50	1.75	2.00	2.25	2.50	2.50	2.75	2.75	3.00	3.25	3.25	3.00	3.55	3.72	3.54	3.46	
3-month interest rate (% eop)	1.15	1.30	1.33	1.56	2.30	2.35	2.62	2.84	3.04	2.99	3.27	3.30	3.55	3.72	3.54	3.46	3.20	3.10	3.00	2.90	
10-year interest rate (% eop)	2.40	2.30	2.30	2.40	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.20	3.30	3.20	3.20	3.20	3.20	3.10	3.00	2.90					
Fiscal balance (% of GDP)					-3.5					-4.0					-4.7					-5.0	
Fiscal thrust (% of GDP)					0.0					1.4					0.8					0.4	
Debt held by public (% of GDP)					76.1					77.3					79.8					83.0	
Eurozone																					
GDP (% QoQ, ann)	2.7	3.0	2.9	2.8	2.4	1.5	1.5	1.7	1.6	2.0	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.2	0.9	1.6	
CPI headline (% YoY)	1.5	1.3	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.7	2.0	1.6	1.7	1.4	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	
Refi minimum bid rate (% eop)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	
3-month interest rate (% eop)	-0.33	-0.33	-0.33	-0.33	-0.33	-0.33	-0.33	-0.33	-0.25	-0.20	-0.10	0.10	0.10	0.15	0.30	0.40	0.50	0.50			
10-year interest rate (% eop)	0.45	0.40	0.45	0.42	0.50	0.30	0.40	0.50	0.60	0.70	0.70	0.80	0.80	0.90	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00			
Fiscal balance (% of GDP)					-0.9					-0.9					-1.1					-1.0	
Fiscal thrust (% of GDP)					0.2					0.2					0.3					0.1	
Gross public debt/GDP (%)					89.2					87.7					86.1					85.1	
Japan																					
GDP (% QoQ, ann)	1.9	2.3	1.6	1.3	1.7	-0.6	1.8	1.9	1.0	1.0	6.1	-7.8	1.2	1.4	0.7	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	0.6	
CPI headline (% YoY)	0.2	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.5	1.3	0.7	1.0	0.6	0.9	0.6	2.2	2.2	2.3	1.8	2.3	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	
Excess reserve rate (%)	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
3-month interest rate (% eop)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	
10-year interest rate (% eop)	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3					
Fiscal balance (% of GDP)					-4.8					-4.1					-3.6					-3.0	
Gross public debt/GDP (%)					221.0					223.0					224.0					226.0	
China																					
GDP (% YoY)	6.9	6.9	6.8	6.8	6.9	6.8	6.7	6.7	6.8	6.8	6.7	6.7	6.6	6.6	6.7	6.6	6.5	6.5	6.4	6.5	
CPI headline (% YoY)	1.4	1.4	1.6	1.8	1.6	2.5	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.2	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.0	1.9	2.0	1.9	1.8	1.7	2.0	
PBOC 7-day reverse repo rate (% eop)	2.45	2.45	2.45	2.50	2.55	2.55	2.55	2.55	2.55	2.55	2.60	2.65	2.70	2.70	2.70	2.70	2.70	2.75	2.75		
10-year T-bond yield (% eop)	3.29	3.57	3.61	3.90	3.75	3.54	3.50	3.40	3.40	3.30	3.20	3.10	3.00	3.00	3.00	2.95	2.95	2.90	2.90		
Fiscal balance (% of GDP)					-3.7					-3.5					-3.5					-3.5	
Public debt, inc local govt (% GDP)					50.0					85.0					100					100	
UK																					
GDP (% QoQ, ann)	1.3	1.0	1.9	1.6	1.5	0.9	1.9	1.5	1.8	1.5	1.4	2.3	1.7	2.1	1.7	1.7	1.7				
CPI headline (% YoY)	2.1	2.7	2.8	3.0	2.7	2.7	2.5	2.5	2.3	2.5	2.2	2.1	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.2	
BoE official bank rate (% eop)	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.25	1.25	1.50	1.50	1.50	
BoE Quantitative Easing (€bn)	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445		
3-month interest rate (% eop)	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.52	0.60	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.85	1.05	1.05	1.05	1.05	1.30	1.35	1.60	1.65	1.65		
10-year interest rate (% eop)	1.15	1.10	1.35	1.20	1.45	1.48	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2		
Fiscal balance (% of GDP)					-2.5					-1.8					-1.7					-1.4	
Fiscal thrust (% of GDP)					-0.5					-0.4					-0.4					-0.3	
Gross public debt/GDP (%)					87.0					86.5					86.0					85.5	
EUR/USD (eop)	1.08	1.12	1.20	1.20	1.25	1.17	1.17	1.23	1.25	1.30	1.33	1.35	1.36	1.37	1.38	1.40					
USD/JPY (eop)	112	115	110	113	107	110	110	110	108	105	102	100	98.0	95.0	93.0	90.0					
USD/CNY (eop)	6.89	6.78	6.65	6.51	6.28	6.67	6.80	7.00	7.00	6.80	6.60	6.50	6.5	6.4	6.4	6.3					
EUR/GBP (eop)	0.87	0.88	0.94	0.89	0.88	0.88	0.88	0.86	0.83	0.82	0.81	0.80	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8					
Brent Crude (US\$/bbl, avg)	55	51	52	61	55	67	72	70	68	69	64	66	67	66	66	61.0	66.0	71.0	66.0	66.0	

¹Lower level of 25bp range; 3-month interest rate forecast based on interbank rates
Source: ING forecasts

Source: ING Global Research

[Click here to download our global forecasts](#)

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US: Keep pushing...

With a strong economy and minimal impact from tariffs, Trump is likely to forge ahead with his agenda ahead of the November elections. Uncertainty and trade tensions could eventually weigh on the economy




Trade tariffs have had little economic impact so far

President Trump's protectionist push had been blamed by some analysts as the reason why 1Q GDP came in at a relatively disappointing 2% annualised growth. However, we think bad weather and the 'typical' seasonal soft patch at the beginning of the year offer a better explanation. There is little evidence that the modest trade tariffs enacted so far have had much impact, especially with high-frequency indicators suggesting that the US economy probably grew by 4% in 2Q18.

Unemployment is at a 50-year low, business and consumer surveys are close to all-time highs and wages are finally showing some evidence of a long-awaited pick-up as firms struggle to find suitable workers. As such, economic momentum is strong and it will take a lot to derail this story.

Trade tariffs alone are unlikely to do that.

The Trump bump?



Source: Macrobond

The Fed will continue hiking interest rates as inflation pushes above 3%

Companies have complained of higher costs and sourcing issues as a result of tariffs, but in an environment of strong demand we have seen few signs of real pain yet. Home builders have been amongst the most vocal with lumber, steel and aluminium tariffs contributing to a \$9,000 increase in the cost of constructing a single family home over the past 18 months. However, home prices have risen more over that time period.

Inflation pressures continue to build with the headline and core (ex food and energy) measures for both consumer price inflation and the personal consumer expenditure deflator at or above the Federal Reserve's 2% target. With oil prices continuing to rise, wages ticking higher and supply bottlenecks adding to price pressures, we look for headline inflation to push above 3% in coming months. This should see the Fed stick with its 'gradual' policy normalisation plan, which essentially means a rate hike every quarter.

Trade tensions are alarming bad businesses


While the story on growth is very positive for now we have to acknowledge escalating trade tensions do risk altering the story. This was reflected in the write-up of the June ISM survey which stated that "demand remains robust, but the nation's employment resources and supply chains continue to struggle. Respondents are overwhelmingly concerned about how tariff related activity is and will continue to affect their business".

Trump's popularity is improving; expect more demands?

Business is likely to become more concerned over the summer. President Trump's personal approval ratings have been trending higher, boosted by the strong economy and his position on

what he terms “unfair” trade practices of other nations. He appears emboldened by this and is pushing on with further rounds of tariffs that will see countermeasures from the Chinese. As such, our trade team believes that we could see another \$600 billion of US-China trade hit by tariffs this month with the potential for Trump, after consultation with industry, to impose levies on foreign cars.

President Trump's approval rating



Source: Gallup

Tariffs could hit sentiment and spending

This will put up the cost of doing business and see consumers pay higher prices, restrict choice and hurt US exporters. However, given the US is a \$20 trillion economy and is less trade dependent than Europe and Asia, we are probably talking direct impacts on growth on the order of a couple of tenths of a percentage point. Moreover, the ongoing support of tax cuts should provide decent underpinnings for activity.

What worries us more is the uncertainty an escalation of tensions generates. Businesses may become more nervous about expansion plans as they fear what happens next, leading to a slowdown in investment spending and job creation. This perception of risk can also quickly sap consumer sentiment. Financial markets are clearly concerned by the situation, with any negative headlines on trade prompting swift falls. A correction in asset prices could compound the downside risks for economic activity.

Calm returning ahead of November elections seems unlikely

We doubt we will see any de-escalation before the 6 November mid-term elections. Despite Trump's improving approval rating, the Republicans continue to lag behind the Democrats in the polls. Trump is likely to sense he needs to get the core Republican vote out and pushing aggressively on trade can help him do that.

That said, opinion polls suggest there is a strong chance the Democrats can win the extra 25 seats they need to take control of the House of Representatives – they are 5-10 percentage points ahead in most national polls. As for the Senate, the Democrats need to hold onto their seats and then

topple two of the eight Republican senators that are up for re-election (a senator's term is six years with a third of the Senate up for re-election every two years).

Post-election, we see greater opportunity for deals to be struck

If we are right and much of the trade rhetoric is tied to the forthcoming US election, there is scope for a deal soon afterwards. It may well be that it is partially tied to European defence spending given Trump's ongoing issue with a lack of expenditure by Nato partners. Trump still talks about getting a deal and we have to remember that talks over the future of Nafta continue quietly in the background despite his threats to rip it up.

Nonetheless, he will need to be cautious about pushing too far, hurting business and market sentiment and risking a more serious downturn. Not only could this lead to sharper revisions to growth, policy rates and bond yields forecasts, but it could also jeopardise any chances of re-election in 2020.

ING global forecasts

	FIRST QUARTER	2017				2018F				2019F				2020F						
		2Q	3Q	4Q	FY	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	FY	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	FY	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	FY
United States																				
GDP (% QoQ, ann)	1.2	3.1	3.2	2.9	2.3	2.0	4.0	3.3	2.3	2.9	1.5	2.2	2.0	1.9	2.2	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.8
CPI headline (% YoY)	2.6	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.3	2.7	2.9	2.6	2.6	2.3	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.1	1.9	2.1
Federal funds (% eop) ¹	0.75	1.00	1.00	1.25		1.50	1.75	2.00	2.25		2.50	2.50	2.75	2.75		3.00	3.25	3.25	3.00	
3-month interest rate (% eop)	1.15	1.30	1.33	1.56		2.30	2.35	2.62	2.84		3.04	2.99	3.27	3.30		3.55	3.72	3.54	3.46	
10-year interest rate (% eop)	2.40	2.30	2.30	2.40		3.00	3.00	3.00	3.20		3.30	3.20	3.20	3.20		3.20	3.10	3.00	2.90	
Fiscal balance (% of GDP)					-3.5					-4.0					-4.7					-5.0
Fiscal thrust (% of GDP)					0.0				1.4						0.8					0.4
Debt held by public (% of GDP)					76.1				77.3						79.8					83.0
Eurozone																				
GDP (% QoQ, ann)	2.7	3.0	2.9	2.8	2.4	1.5	1.5	1.7	1.6	2.0	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.2	0.9	1.6
CPI headline (% YoY)	1.5	1.3	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.7	2.0	1.6	1.7	1.4	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7
Refi minimum bid rate (% eop)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50
3-month interest rate (% eop)	-0.33	-0.33	-0.33	-0.33		-0.33	-0.33	-0.33	-0.33		-0.25	-0.20	-0.10	0.10	0.10	0.15	0.30	0.40	0.50	0.50
10-year interest rate (% eop)	0.45	0.40	0.45	0.42		0.50	0.30	0.40	0.50		0.60	0.70	0.70	0.80	0.80	0.90	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Fiscal balance (% of GDP)					-0.9					-0.9					-1.1					-1.0
Fiscal thrust (% of GDP)					0.2					0.2					0.3					0.1
Gross public debt/GDP (%)					89.2				87.7						86.1					85.1
Japan																				
GDP (% QoQ, ann)	1.9	2.3	1.6	1.3	1.7	-0.6	1.8	1.9	1.0	1.0	6.1	-7.8	1.2	1.4	0.7	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	0.6
CPI headline (% YoY)	0.2	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.5	1.3	0.7	1.0	0.6	0.9	0.6	2.2	2.2	2.3	1.8	2.3	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
Excess reserve rate (%)	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1		-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1		-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
3-month interest rate (% eop)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.0	0.0	0.05	0.1		0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	
10-year interest rate (% eop)	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10		0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10		0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1		0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	
Fiscal balance (% of GDP)					-4.8					-4.1					-3.6					-3.0
Gross public debt/GDP (%)					221.0				223.0						224.0					226.0
China																				
GDP (% YoY)	6.9	6.9	6.8	6.8	6.9	6.8	6.7	6.7	6.8	6.8	6.7	6.7	6.6	6.6	6.7	6.6	6.5	6.5	6.4	6.5
CPI headline (% YoY)	1.4	1.4	1.6	1.8	1.6	2.5	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.2	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.0	1.9	2.0	1.9	1.8	1.7	2.0
PBOC 7-day reverse repo rate (% eop)	2.45	2.45	2.45	2.50		2.55	2.55	2.55	2.55	2.55	2.55	2.60	2.65	2.70	2.70	2.70	2.70	2.70	2.75	2.75
10-year T-bond yield (% eop)	3.29	3.57	3.61	3.90		3.75	3.54	3.50	3.40	3.40	3.30	3.20	3.10	3.00	3.00	3.00	2.95	2.95	2.90	2.90
Fiscal balance (% of GDP)					-3.7					-3.5					-3.5					-3.5
Public debt, inc local govt (% GDP)					50.0				85.0						100					100
UK																				
GDP (% QoQ, ann)	1.3	1.0	1.9	1.6	1.5	0.9	1.9	1.5	1.8		1.5	1.4	2.3	1.7		2.1	1.7	1.7	1.7	
CPI headline (% YoY)	2.1	2.7	2.8	3.0	2.7	2.7	2.5	2.5	2.3	2.5	2.2	2.1	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.2
BoE official bank rate (% eop)	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.25	1.25	1.50	1.50	1.50
BoE Quantitative Easing (Ebn)	445	445	445	445		445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445
3-month interest rate (% eop)	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.52		0.60	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.85	1.05	1.05	1.05	1.05	1.30	1.35	1.60	1.65	1.65
10-year interest rate (% eop)	1.15	1.10	1.35	1.20		1.45	1.48	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2
Fiscal balance (% of GDP)					-2.5					-1.8					-1.7					-1.4
Fiscal thrust (% of GDP)					-0.5					-0.4					-0.4					-0.3
Gross public debt/GDP (%)					87.0				86.5						86.0					85.5
EUR/USD (eop)	1.08	1.12	1.20	1.20		1.25	1.17	1.17	1.23		1.25	1.30	1.33	1.35		1.36	1.37	1.38	1.40	
USD/JPY (eop)	112	115	110	113		107	110	110	110		108	105	102	100		98.0	95.0	93.0	90.0	
USD/CNY (eop)	6.89	6.78	6.65	6.51		6.28	6.67	6.80	7.00		7.00	6.80	6.60	6.50		6.5	6.4	6.4	6.3	
EUR/GBP (eop)	0.87	0.88	0.94	0.89		0.88	0.88	0.88	0.86		0.83	0.82	0.81	0.80		0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	
Brent Crude (US\$/bbl, avg)	55	51	52	61	55	67	72	70	68	69	64	66	67	66	66	61.0	66.0	71.0	66.0	66.0

¹Lower level of 25bp range; 3-month interest rate forecast based on interbank rates
Source: ING forecasts

Source: ING Global Research

[Click here to download our global forecasts](#)

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FX: Evaluating the scenarios

This July could prove to be a testing month for FX markets, given the rise in trade tensions



There's more value in outlining potential scenarios

This is a particularly uncertain time for FX markets; where the escalation in the global trade war ends nobody knows. This makes a baseline FX scenario exceptionally difficult.

Rather than delivering back-to-back cuts in our baseline EUR/USD profile (despite mounting pressure in that direction) this month we believe there's more value in outlining potential scenarios. [Our full scenario analysis can be found here.](#)

Below we summarise four potential paths for EUR/USD into 2019, all supported by various assumptions for some of the key inputs, such as rate spreads and risk premia.

Four scenarios for EUR/USD into end 2019 (Click to enlarge)

EUR/USD could potentially see 1.10 this summer

Compared to a tentative baseline of EUR/USD recovering to 1.23 by the end of the year, risks look

clearly skewed to the downside. Were the Trump team to accelerate their review of auto imports and formally adopt the 20% tariffs on EU auto imports, we could potentially see 1.10 this summer. A scenario of 1.05 would, however, require: a) peak rate divergence where the US economy/Fed pricing is immune to rising trade tensions and b) peak pessimism on German and Italian politics.

It also remains a challenging time for EM FX. Slowing world trade and the Fed potentially taking policy into 'tight' territory could see the headwinds to EM turn into a hurricane.

EUR/USD spot rate projections

ING global forecasts

	FIRST QUARTER	2017				2018F				2019F				2020F						
		2Q	3Q	4Q	FY	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	FY	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	FY	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	FY
United States																				
GDP (% QoQ, ann)	1.2	3.1	3.2	2.9	2.3	2.0	4.0	3.3	2.3	2.9	1.5	2.2	2.0	1.9	2.2	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.8
CPI headline (% YoY)	2.6	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.3	2.7	2.9	2.6	2.6	2.3	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.1	1.9	2.1
Federal funds (% eop) ¹	0.75	1.00	1.00	1.25		1.50	1.75	2.00	2.25		2.50	2.50	2.75	2.75		3.00	3.25	3.25	3.00	
3-month interest rate (% eop)	1.15	1.30	1.33	1.56		2.30	2.35	2.62	2.84		3.04	2.99	3.27	3.30		3.55	3.72	3.54	3.46	
10-year interest rate (% eop)	2.40	2.30	2.30	2.40		3.00	3.00	3.00	3.20		3.30	3.20	3.20	3.20		3.20	3.10	3.00	2.90	
Fiscal balance (% of GDP)					-3.5					-4.0					-4.7					-5.0
Fiscal thrust (% of GDP)					0.0				1.4						0.8					0.4
Debt held by public (% of GDP)					76.1				77.3						79.8					83.0
Eurozone																				
GDP (% QoQ, ann)	2.7	3.0	2.9	2.8	2.4	1.5	1.5	1.7	1.6	2.0	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.2	0.9	1.6
CPI headline (% YoY)	1.5	1.3	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.7	2.0	1.6	1.7	1.4	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7
Refi minimum bid rate (% eop)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50
3-month interest rate (% eop)	-0.33	-0.33	-0.33	-0.33		-0.33	-0.33	-0.33	-0.33		-0.25	-0.20	-0.10	0.10	0.10	0.15	0.30	0.40	0.50	0.50
10-year interest rate (% eop)	0.45	0.40	0.45	0.42		0.50	0.30	0.40	0.50		0.60	0.70	0.70	0.80	0.80	0.90	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Fiscal balance (% of GDP)					-0.9					-0.9					-1.1					-1.0
Fiscal thrust (% of GDP)					0.2					0.2					0.3					0.1
Gross public debt/GDP (%)					89.2					87.7					86.1					85.1
Japan																				
GDP (% QoQ, ann)	1.9	2.3	1.6	1.3	1.7	-0.6	1.8	1.9	1.0	1.0	6.1	-7.8	1.2	1.4	0.7	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	0.6
CPI headline (% YoY)	0.2	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.5	1.3	0.7	1.0	0.6	0.9	0.6	2.2	2.2	2.3	1.8	2.3	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
Excess reserve rate (%)	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1		-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1		-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	0.0		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
3-month interest rate (% eop)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.0	0.0	0.05	0.1		0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
10-year interest rate (% eop)	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10		0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10		0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1		0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	
Fiscal balance (% of GDP)					-4.8					-4.1					-3.6					-3.0
Gross public debt/GDP (%)					221.0					223.0					224.0					226.0
China																				
GDP (% YoY)	6.9	6.9	6.8	6.8	6.9	6.8	6.7	6.7	6.8	6.8	6.7	6.7	6.6	6.6	6.7	6.6	6.5	6.5	6.4	6.5
CPI headline (% YoY)	1.4	1.4	1.6	1.8	1.6	2.5	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.2	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.0	1.9	2.0	1.9	1.8	1.7	2.0
PBOC 7-day reverse repo rate (% eop)	2.45	2.45	2.45	2.50		2.55	2.55	2.55	2.55	2.55	2.55	2.60	2.65	2.70	2.70	2.70	2.70	2.70	2.75	2.75
10-year T-bond yield (% eop)	3.29	3.57	3.61	3.90		3.75	3.54	3.50	3.40	3.40	3.30	3.20	3.10	3.00	3.00	3.00	2.95	2.95	2.90	2.90
Fiscal balance (% of GDP)					-3.7					-3.5					-3.5					-3.5
Public debt, inc local govt (% GDP)					50.0					85.0					100					100
UK																				
GDP (% QoQ, ann)	1.3	1.0	1.9	1.6	1.5	0.9	1.9	1.5	1.8		1.5	1.4	2.3	1.7		2.1	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7
CPI headline (% YoY)	2.1	2.7	2.8	3.0	2.7	2.7	2.5	2.5	2.3	2.5	2.2	2.1	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.2
BoE official bank rate (% eop)	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.25	1.25	1.50	1.50	1.50
BoE Quantitative Easing (Ebn)	445	445	445	445		445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445
3-month interest rate (% eop)	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.52		0.60	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.85	1.05	1.05	1.05	1.05	1.30	1.35	1.60	1.65	1.65
10-year interest rate (% eop)	1.15	1.10	1.35	1.20		1.45	1.48	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2
Fiscal balance (% of GDP)					-2.5					-1.8					-1.7					-1.4
Fiscal thrust (% of GDP)					-0.5					-0.4					-0.4					-0.3
Gross public debt/GDP (%)					87.0					86.5					86.0					85.5
EUR/USD (eop)	1.08	1.12	1.20	1.20		1.25	1.17	1.17	1.23		1.25	1.30	1.33	1.35		1.36	1.37	1.38	1.40	
USD/JPY (eop)	112	115	110	113		107	110	110	110		108	105	102	100		98.0	95.0	93.0	90.0	
USD/CNY (eop)	6.89	6.78	6.65	6.51		6.28	6.67	6.80	7.00		7.00	6.80	6.60	6.50		6.5	6.4	6.4	6.3	
EUR/GBP (eop)	0.87	0.88	0.94	0.89		0.88	0.88	0.88	0.86		0.83	0.82	0.81	0.80		0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	
Brent Crude (US\$/bbl, avg)	55	51	52	61	55	67	72	70	68	69	64	66	67	66	66	61.0	66.0	71.0	66.0	66.0

¹Lower level of 25bp range; 3-month interest rate forecast based on interbank rates
Source: ING forecasts

Source: ING Global Research

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Article | 6 July 2018

Rates: Just 30bp, seriously?

This July, rates remain under wraps due to dollar strength, geopolitics and a resistance by central banks to hike rates



The 'too low' 30bp German 10yr yield

The fall to sub 30bp for the 10yr German yield is remarkable when contextualised against an ECB intending to (1) end quantitative easing (QE) this year and ready to (2) raise rates next year. While there is lots of talk about a weakening economy, that's neither the driver nor a persuasive argument. We think there are two dominant influences, which added to a number of sideshows, are keeping rates under wraps.

1 Dollar strength

The first of the dominant influences is dollar strength and the risk that more could still be in the works. The transition mechanism here is chiefly through emerging markets, as the firmer dollar has exposed vulnerabilities in the likes of Turkey and Argentina, among others. While there has not been mass contagion, there has been correlation and outflows generally from risk assets as a result. The counterflow is into core bonds.

And by the way, the ECB's intention to exit QE has seen the bid falter in investment grade Euro corporates too, adding to strain in lower rating product.

2

The Eurozone factor


The second dominant influence is Italy and the wider Euro project. This is a big driver for flows into Germany in particular. A decent rump of the bid to bunds is driven by its hedge quality should things ever turn sour; effectively it is a long in a Deutschmark proxy. Pension funds will always be forgiven for over-allocating in the ultra-safe core.

The market's questioning rate hike ambitions

The various sideshows then centre on geopolitics, the trade war narrative (which risks becoming a dominant influence, but we're not there quite yet) and market chatter on resistance to future hikes from central banks. For example, there is no conviction rate hike discount for the Fed above 2.75%, and many doubt the ECB will be in sync enough with the current upturn to get any material traction on a 2019/20 rate-hiking cycle.


This all leaves investors with a nervousness on being too short carry, and the average investor has been slowly liquidating some of the over-exposure on the front end of the yield curve and fading longs back into the belly and long end funds. This can be clearly gleaned from flows data in the past month, although on a 3-month snapshot we still find a heavy overweight build in the front end over the back end (implied duration short).

Change in assets under management – last month



Source: EPFR Global, ING estimates

Change in assets under management – last quarter



Source: EPFR Global, ING estimates

The 3% 10yr US remains in the rear view mirror

In consequence, the 10yr Treasury yield finds the path of least resistance is lower, with 3% now seen as a hurdle too far, at least for now. That all said, our US macro model for rates continues to flag fair value at north of 3% but below 3.5%; essentially we find that market rates should be 100bp above the normal rate, which we identify as 2.25% (flat to core inflation). Bund yields would correlate higher and should rise by more.

As our US economist eloquently notes, this is a near 7% nominal growth rate environment. It won't last, but there is a window ahead for rates to re-test higher again.

ING global forecasts

	FIRST QUARTER	2017				2018F				2019F				2020F							
		2Q	3Q	4Q	FY	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	FY	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	FY	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	FY	
United States																					
GDP (% QoQ, ann)		1.2	3.1	3.2	2.9	2.3	2.0	4.0	3.3	2.3	2.9	1.5	2.2	2.0	1.9	2.2	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.8
CPI headline (% YoY)		2.6	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.3	2.7	2.9	2.6	2.6	2.3	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.1	1.9	2.1
Federal Funds (% eop) ¹		0.75	1.00	1.00	1.25		1.50	1.75	2.00	2.25		2.50	2.50	2.75	2.75		3.00	3.25	3.25	3.00	
3-month interest rate (% eop)		1.15	1.30	1.33	1.56		2.30	2.35	2.62	2.84		3.04	2.99	3.27	3.30		3.55	3.72	3.54	3.46	
10-year interest rate (% eop)		2.40	2.30	2.30	2.40		3.00	3.00	3.00	3.20		3.30	3.20	3.20	3.20		3.20	3.10	3.00	2.90	
Fiscal balance (% of GDP)					-3.5					-4.0					-4.7					-5.0	
Fiscal thrust (% of GDP)					0.0					1.4					0.8					0.4	
Debt held by public (% of GDP)					76.1					77.3					79.8					83.0	
Eurozone																					
GDP (% QoQ, ann)		2.7	3.0	2.9	2.8	2.4	1.5	1.5	1.7	1.6	2.0	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.2	0.9	1.6
CPI headline (% YoY)		1.5	1.3	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.7	2.0	1.6	1.7	1.4	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7
Refi minimum bid rate (% eop)		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	
3-month interest rate (% eop)		-0.33	-0.33	-0.33	-0.33		-0.33	-0.33	-0.33	-0.33		-0.25	-0.20	-0.10	0.10	0.10	0.15	0.30	0.40	0.50	0.50
10-year interest rate (% eop)		0.45	0.40	0.45	0.42		0.50	0.30	0.40	0.50		0.60	0.70	0.70	0.80	0.80	0.90	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Fiscal balance (% of GDP)					-0.9					-0.9					-1.1					-1.0	
Fiscal thrust (% of GDP)					0.2					0.2					0.3					0.1	
Gross public debt/GDP (%)					89.2					87.7					86.1					85.1	
Japan																					
GDP (% QoQ, ann)		1.9	2.3	1.6	1.3	1.7	-0.6	1.8	1.9	1.0	1.0	6.1	-7.8	1.2	1.4	0.7	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	0.6
CPI headline (% YoY)		0.2	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.5	1.3	0.7	1.0	0.6	0.9	0.6	2.2	2.2	2.3	1.8	2.3	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
Excess reserve rate (%)		-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1		-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1		-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	
3-month interest rate (% eop)		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.0	0.0	0.05	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	
10-year interest rate (% eop)		0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10		0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10		0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1		0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	
Fiscal balance (% of GDP)					-4.8					-4.1					-3.6					-3.0	
Gross public debt/GDP (%)					221.0					223.0					224.0					226.0	
China																					
GDP (% YoY)		6.9	6.9	6.8	6.8	6.9	6.8	6.7	6.7	6.8	6.8	6.7	6.7	6.6	6.6	6.7	6.6	6.5	6.5	6.4	6.5
CPI headline (% YoY)		1.4	1.4	1.6	1.8	1.6	2.5	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.2	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.0	1.9	2.0	1.9	1.8	1.7	2.0
PBOC 7-day reverse repo rate (% eop)		2.45	2.45	2.45	2.50		2.55	2.55	2.55	2.55	2.55	2.55	2.60	2.65	2.70	2.70	2.70	2.70	2.70	2.75	2.75
10-year T-bond yield (% eop)		3.29	3.57	3.61	3.90		3.75	3.54	3.50	3.40	3.40	3.30	3.20	3.10	3.00	3.00	3.00	2.95	2.95	2.90	2.90
Fiscal balance (% of GDP)					-3.7					-3.5					-3.5					-3.5	
Public debt, inc local govt (% GDP)					50.0					85.0					100					100	
UK																					
GDP (% QoQ, ann)		1.3	1.0	1.9	1.6	1.5	0.9	1.9	1.5	1.8		1.5	1.4	2.3	1.7		2.1	1.7	1.7	1.7	
CPI headline (% YoY)		2.1	2.7	2.8	3.0	2.7	2.7	2.5	2.5	2.3	2.5	2.2	2.1	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.2
BoE official bank rate (% eop)		0.25	0.25	0.25	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.25	1.25	1.50	1.50	1.50
BoE Quantitative Easing (Ebn)		445	445	445	445		445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445
3-month interest rate (% eop)		0.35	0.35	0.35	0.52		0.60	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.85	1.05	1.05	1.05	1.05	1.30	1.35	1.60	1.65	1.65
10-year interest rate (% eop)		1.15	1.10	1.35	1.20		1.45	1.48	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2
Fiscal balance (% of GDP)					-2.5					-1.8					-1.7					-1.4	
Fiscal thrust (% of GDP)					-0.5					-0.4					-0.4					-0.3	
Gross public debt/GDP (%)					87.0					86.5					86.0					85.5	
EUR/USD (eop)		1.08	1.12	1.20	1.20		1.25	1.17	1.17	1.23		1.25	1.30	1.33	1.35		1.36	1.37	1.38	1.40	
USD/JPY (eop)		112	115	110	113		107	110	110	110		108	105	102	100		98.0	95.0	93.0	90.0	
EUR/CNY (eop)		6.89	6.78	6.65	6.51		6.28	6.67	6.80	7.00		7.00	6.80	6.60	6.50		6.5	6.4	6.4	6.3	
EUR/GBP (eop)		0.87	0.88	0.94	0.89		0.88	0.88	0.88	0.86		0.83	0.82	0.81	0.80		0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	
Brent Crude (US\$/bbl, avg)		55	51	52	61	55	67	72	70	68	69	64	66	67	66	66	61.0	66.0	71.0	66.0	66.0

¹Lower level of 25bp range; 3-month interest rate forecast based on interbank rates
Source: ING forecasts

Source: ING Global Research

[Click here to download our global forecasts.](#)

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China: The retaliation cycle

A tit-for-tat trade war will hurt China's economic growth in the second quarter and will put pressure on the yuan



The trade war officially begins

On Friday, the US imposed tariffs on \$34 billion of Chinese goods prompting China to respond with [levies of its own](#). The US administration is keen to close the trade deficit, and it believes that imposing tariffs on China can do the trick. We don't agree with this rationale.

We expect that this is just the beginning of the trade war. The US will likely hit back, and though this may not happen immediately, it's just a matter of time. When the US does retaliate, China will too, probably without any delay. The momentum of this trade battle is controlled by the US. It can retaliate quickly to rock the market, or do so more slowly to allow investors to adjust.


Economic growth to soften in 2Q18

So how could this affect the economy? Well, tariffs don't just reduce the profit margins of exporters, they can also mean that exporters lose out on entire orders to other economies that trade similar goods. China's exports could be hit, and supply chain industries in China could be affected. This includes logistic services and packaging manufacturers, as well as the affected exporters' suppliers. This has been reflected in lower PMI readings (driven by lower export orders), which would imply lower 2H18 export activity. We suspect the negative impact from the trade war

has yet to be fully reflected in the economic data.

But the threat from the trade war that has delayed investment decisions is not the only negative factor for the economy. Financial deleveraging reform is biting economic activity, especially in infrastructure investment, and therefore [we have lowered our 2Q18 GDP forecast from 6.8% YoY to 6.7%](#).

PMI shows export orders shrinking while domestic orders holding up well



Source: ING, Bloomberg

Supportive measures in 2H18 would stabilise growth

Having said that, we're still optimistic for economic growth in the second half of the year given the supportive measures being implemented by the government. Firstly, by not following the Fed in hiking the 7-day reverse repo and instead cutting the reserve ratio, the central bank (PBoC) has started to switch its monetary policy stance from tightening to loosening. These policies should help stabilise borrowing costs faced by corporates, especially SMEs, which could be hurt most by a trade war.

Secondly, there's fiscal spending, with participation in technology-related investment pools. Though these investment pools would not benefit export sectors, they would directly contribute to GDP, and raise the chances of China having its own high-tech components (for example advanced semiconductor chips) in the future.

We also expect other fiscal support - eg, restructuring the individual salary tax - to support domestic consumption, and could increase domestic sales to reduce the impact of tariffs on exports. In the past, this has not proved easy, because goods destined for export were considered to be too expensive for the domestic market. But this has changed. We expect that both the export market and the domestic market are now more compatible with an increasing middle class.

Put this all together, and our baseline case is that GDP will rise in the second half of 2018 at a rate of 6.7% year on year.

Yuan could continue to weaken as trade war continues

We have also revised our end-year [USD/CNY forecast to 7.0](#) from 6.60, and forecast the same USD/CNH as we believe the spread between CNY and CNH will continue to be small.

This revision reflects the fact that China has room to let the currency weaken by market forces in the middle of a trade war because it is opening up its market to attract more capital inflows. It reduces our previous concern that a weaker yuan would deplete foreign exchange reserves.

7.00 per dollar seems a steep depreciation but this speed is in line with [our forecasts of other Asian currencies](#). China cannot defy gravity when it comes to appreciating against other Asian currencies, especially against Japan, South Korea and Taiwan because these are competitors in electronic exports. China won't depreciate against these Asian currencies because it won't initiate a currency war in the middle of a trade war.

ING global forecasts

	2017				2018F				2019F				2020F							
	FIRST	2Q	3Q	4Q	FY	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	FY	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	FY					
	QUA																			
	RTER																			
United States																				
GDP (% QoQ, ann)	1.2	3.1	3.2	2.9	2.3	2.0	4.0	3.3	2.3	2.9	1.5	2.2	2.0	1.9	2.2	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.8
CPI headline (% YoY)	2.6	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.3	2.7	2.9	2.6	2.6	2.3	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.1	1.9	2.1
Federal funds (% eop) ¹	0.75	1.00	1.00	1.25		1.50	1.75	2.00	2.25		2.50	2.50	2.75	2.75		3.00	3.25	3.25	3.00	
3-month interest rate (% eop)	1.15	1.30	1.33	1.56		2.30	2.35	2.62	2.84		3.04	2.99	3.27	3.30		3.55	3.72	3.54	3.46	
10-year interest rate (% eop)	2.40	2.30	2.30	2.40		3.00	3.00	3.00	3.20		3.30	3.20	3.20	3.20		3.20	3.10	3.00	2.90	
Fiscal balance (% of GDP)					-3.5					-4.0					-4.7					-5.0
Fiscal thrust (% of GDP)					0.0					1.4					0.8					0.4
Debt held by public (% of GDP)					76.1					77.3					79.8					83.0
Eurozone																				
GDP (% QoQ, ann)	2.7	3.0	2.9	2.8	2.4	1.5	1.5	1.7	1.6	2.0	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.2	0.9	1.6
CPI headline (% YoY)	1.5	1.3	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.7	2.0	1.6	1.7	1.4	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7
Refi minimum bid rate (% eop)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50
3-month interest rate (% eop)	-0.33	-0.33	-0.33	-0.33		-0.33	-0.33	-0.33	-0.33		-0.25	-0.20	-0.10	0.10	0.10	0.15	0.30	0.40	0.50	0.50
10-year interest rate (% eop)	0.45	0.40	0.45	0.42		0.50	0.30	0.40	0.50		0.60	0.70	0.70	0.80	0.80	0.90	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Fiscal balance (% of GDP)					-0.9					-0.9					-1.1					-1.0
Fiscal thrust (% of GDP)					0.2					0.2					0.3					0.1
Gross public debt/GDP (%)					89.2					87.7					86.1					85.1
Japan																				
GDP (% QoQ, ann)	1.9	2.3	1.6	1.3	1.7	-0.6	1.8	1.9	1.0	1.0	6.1	-7.8	1.2	1.4	0.7	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	0.6
CPI headline (% YoY)	0.2	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.5	1.3	0.7	1.0	0.6	0.9	0.6	2.2	2.2	2.3	1.8	2.3	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
Excess reserve rate (%)	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1		-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1		-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	0.0		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
3-month interest rate (% eop)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.0	0.0	0.05	0.1		0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
10-year interest rate (% eop)	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10		0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10		0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1		0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	
Fiscal balance (% of GDP)					-4.8					-4.1					-3.6					-3.0
Gross public debt/GDP (%)					221.0					223.0					224.0					226.0
China																				
GDP (% YoY)	6.9	6.9	6.8	6.8	6.9	6.8	6.7	6.7	6.8	6.8	6.7	6.7	6.6	6.6	6.7	6.6	6.5	6.5	6.4	6.5
CPI headline (% YoY)	1.4	1.4	1.6	1.8	1.6	2.5	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.2	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.0	1.9	2.0	1.9	1.8	1.7	2.0
PBOC 7-day reverse repo rate (% eop)	2.45	2.45	2.45	2.50		2.55	2.55	2.55	2.55	2.55	2.55	2.60	2.65	2.70	2.70	2.70	2.70	2.70	2.75	2.75
10-year T-bond yield (% eop)	3.29	3.57	3.61	3.90		3.75	3.54	3.50	3.40	3.40	3.30	3.20	3.10	3.00	3.00	3.00	2.95	2.95	2.90	2.90
Fiscal balance (% of GDP)					-3.7					-3.5					-3.5					-3.5
Public debt, inc local govt (% GDP)					50.0					85.0					100					100
UK																				
GDP (% QoQ, ann)	1.3	1.0	1.9	1.6	1.5	0.9	1.9	1.5	1.8		1.5	1.4	2.3	1.7		2.1	1.7	1.7	1.7	
CPI headline (% YoY)	2.1	2.7	2.8	3.0	2.7	2.7	2.5	2.5	2.3	2.5	2.2	2.1	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.2
BoE official bank rate (% eop)	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.25	1.25	1.50	1.50	1.50
BoE Quantitative Easing (fbn)	445	445	445	445		445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445
3-month interest rate (% eop)	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.52		0.60	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.85	1.05	1.05	1.05	1.05	1.30	1.35	1.60	1.65	1.65
10-year interest rate (% eop)	1.15	1.10	1.35	1.20		1.45	1.48	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2
Fiscal balance (% of GDP)					-2.5					-1.8					-1.7					-1.4
Fiscal thrust (% of GDP)					-0.5					-0.4					-0.4					-0.3
Gross public debt/GDP (%)					87.0					86.5					86.0					85.5
EUR/USD (eop)	1.08	1.12	1.20	1.20		1.25	1.17	1.17	1.23		1.25	1.30	1.33	1.35		1.36	1.37	1.38	1.40	
USD/JPY (eop)	112	115	110	113		107	110	110	110		108	105	102	100		98.0	95.0	93.0	90.0	
USD/CNY (eop)	6.89	6.78	6.65	6.51		6.28	6.67	6.80	7.00		7.00	6.80	6.60	6.50		6.5	6.4	6.4	6.3	
EUR/GBP (eop)	0.87	0.88	0.94	0.89		0.88	0.88	0.88	0.86		0.83	0.82	0.81	0.80		0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	
Brent Crude (US\$/bbl, avg)	55	51	52	61	55	67	72	70	68	69	64	66	67	66	66	61.0	66.0	71.0	66.0	66.0

¹Lower level of 25bp range; 3-month interest rate forecast based on interbank rates
Source: ING forecasts

Source: ING Global Research

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
Japan: Momentum slipping

Japan's activity indicators have slipped from 'good' to 'mediocre', but its unclear if this downtrend will continue



Source: istock

Tankan and GDP



Tankan survey and Japanese GDP

Japanese growth appears to have peaked in 1Q18, if the latest Tankan survey can be taken at face value, and unlike the official Japanese GDP data, it probably can. But although the headline index fell, and by more than had been expected, there are one or two reasons not to get too downbeat about the Japanese economy just yet.

For starters, the non-manufacturing surveys- and diffusion indices for smaller firms- were a lot less negative (indeed, sometimes actually rose) than the large manufacturing series. Though this might simply be a factor of timing. Large manufacturing firms are typically more export-oriented and so have probably been more rapidly affected by plunging sentiment about trade and export orders than their more domestically-oriented and smaller suppliers and service sector support firms. Should the global trading environment worsen further - and we expect it to do so - then it is probably only a matter of time before these other firms go the same way as their larger manufacturing counterparts.


But don't forget investment

Investment has really picked up the pace. And the thing about investment is that when it is growing, it usually does so far faster than the underlying pace of other GDP growth, lifting other sectors in its wake.

Admittedly, the profit outlook detailed in the latest Tankan survey wasn't too impressive, but that, in turn, may reflect some higher employment and even stronger wages growth. Scheduled cash earnings in April slid back to 0.9% year on year, but this looks like noise, and the recent sharp uptrend in wages growth still looks firmly in place.

So all things considered, the Japanese outlook remains reasonably good with stronger domestic demand helping to offset what looks like an unavoidable, but moderate slowdown in the manufacturing export sector.

Scheduled cash earnings - they haven't done this for ages



Source: CEIC

Bank of Japan still hamstrung by inappropriate inflation target

All this leaves the Bank of Japan (BoJ) wrestling with a policy target that it will never reach (2.0% inflation), and the latest tick higher by the Tokyo headline CPI index leaves it barely over a quarter (0.6%YoY) of the target.

The 10-year Japanese government bond (JGB) has seen its yield slide in recent weeks, now at just 0.033%. With little pressure for yields to do anything but decline, the BoJ has continued its policy of opportunistic skipping of scheduled bond purchases and flagrant backsliding compared to its targeted pace of asset accumulation. We can only expect this backsliding to continue or even increase as time goes on.

Meanwhile, the cover the BoJ has been waiting for from the European Central Bank (ECB) tapering its policy has not been forthcoming, as clever sleight of hand by the ECB has enabled it to move towards a taper, even the end of negative deposit rates, but in such a slow and disappointing fashion in terms of foreign exchange markets, that it has provided little if any diversion for the BoJ to undertake a similar directional move. This is unlikely to change in the current environment, and we have pushed back the timing of the BoJ's own end to negative rates until 2020.

ING global forecasts

	FIRST QUARTER	2017				2018F				2019F				2020F							
		2Q	3Q	4Q	FY	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	FY	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	FY	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	FY	
United States																					
GDP (% QoQ, ann)		1.2	3.1	3.2	2.9	2.3	2.0	4.0	3.3	2.3	2.9	1.5	2.2	2.0	1.9	2.2	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.8
CPI headline (% YoY)		2.6	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.3	2.7	2.9	2.6	2.6	2.3	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.1	1.9	2.1
Federal funds (% eop) ¹		0.75	1.00	1.00	1.25		1.50	1.75	2.00	2.25		2.50	2.50	2.75	2.75		3.00	3.25	3.25	3.00	
3-month interest rate (% eop)		1.15	1.30	1.33	1.56		2.30	2.35	2.62	2.84		3.04	2.99	3.27	3.30		3.55	3.72	3.54	3.46	
10-year interest rate (% eop)		2.40	2.30	2.30	2.40		3.00	3.00	3.00	3.20		3.30	3.20	3.20	3.20		3.20	3.10	3.00	2.90	
Fiscal balance (% of GDP)					-3.5					-4.0					-4.7						-5.0
Fiscal thrust (% of GDP)					0.0					1.4					0.8						0.4
Debt held by public (% of GDP)					76.1					77.3					79.8						83.0
Eurozone																					
GDP (% QoQ, ann)		2.7	3.0	2.9	2.8	2.4	1.5	1.5	1.7	1.6	2.0	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.2	0.9	1.6
CPI headline (% YoY)		1.5	1.3	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.7	2.0	1.6	1.7	1.4	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7
Refi minimum bid rate (% eop)		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50
3-month interest rate (% eop)		-0.33	-0.33	-0.33	-0.33		-0.33	-0.33	-0.33	-0.33		-0.25	-0.20	-0.10	0.10	0.10	0.15	0.30	0.40	0.50	0.50
10-year interest rate (% eop)		0.45	0.40	0.45	0.42		0.50	0.30	0.40	0.50		0.60	0.70	0.70	0.80	0.80	0.90	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Fiscal balance (% of GDP)					-0.9					-0.9					-1.1						-1.0
Fiscal thrust (% of GDP)					0.2					0.2					0.3						0.1
Gross public debt/GDP (%)					89.2					87.7					86.1						85.1
Japan																					
GDP (% QoQ, ann)		1.9	2.3	1.6	1.3	1.7	-0.6	1.8	1.9	1.0	1.0	6.1	-7.8	1.2	1.4	0.7	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	0.6
CPI headline (% YoY)		0.2	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.5	1.3	0.7	1.0	0.6	0.9	0.6	2.2	2.2	2.3	1.8	2.3	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
Excess reserve rate (%)		-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1		-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1		-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
3-month interest rate (% eop)		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.0	0.0	0.05	0.1		0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
10-year interest rate (% eop)		0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10		0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10		0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1		0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	
Fiscal balance (% of GDP)					-4.8					-4.1					-3.6						-3.0
Gross public debt/GDP (%)					221.0					223.0					224.0						226.0
China																					
GDP (% YoY)		6.9	6.9	6.8	6.8	6.9	6.8	6.7	6.7	6.8	6.8	6.7	6.7	6.6	6.6	6.7	6.6	6.5	6.5	6.4	6.5
CPI headline (% YoY)		1.4	1.4	1.6	1.8	1.6	2.5	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.2	1.9	1.9	1.9	2.0	1.9	2.0	1.9	1.8	1.7	2.0
PBOC 7-day reverse repo rate (% eop)		2.45	2.45	2.45	2.50		2.55	2.55	2.55	2.55	2.55	2.55	2.60	2.65	2.70	2.70	2.70	2.70	2.70	2.75	2.75
10-year T-bond yield (% eop)		3.29	3.57	3.61	3.90		3.75	3.54	3.50	3.40	3.40	3.30	3.20	3.10	3.00	3.00	3.00	2.95	2.95	2.90	2.90
Fiscal balance (% of GDP)					-3.7					-3.5					-3.5						-3.5
Public debt, inc local govt. (% GDP)					50.0					85.0					100						100
UK																					
GDP (% QoQ, ann)		1.3	1.0	1.9	1.6	1.5	0.9	1.9	1.5	1.8		1.5	1.4	2.3	1.7		2.1	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7
CPI headline (% YoY)		2.1	2.7	2.8	3.0	2.7	2.7	2.5	2.5	2.3	2.5	2.2	2.1	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.2
BoE official bank rate (% eop)		0.25	0.25	0.25	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.25	1.25	1.50	1.50	1.50
BoE Quantitative Easing (Ebn)		445	445	445	445		445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445	445
3-month interest rate (% eop)		0.35	0.35	0.35	0.52		0.60	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.85	1.05	1.05	1.05	1.05	1.30	1.35	1.60	1.65	1.65
10-year interest rate (% eop)		1.15	1.10	1.35	1.20		1.45	1.48	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2
Fiscal balance (% of GDP)					-2.5					-1.8					-1.7						-1.4
Fiscal thrust (% of GDP)					-0.5					-0.4					-0.4						-0.3
Gross public debt/GDP (%)					87.0					86.5					86.0						85.5
EUR/USD (eop)		1.08	1.12	1.20	1.20		1.25	1.17	1.17	1.23		1.25	1.30	1.33	1.35		1.36	1.37	1.38	1.40	
USD/JPY (eop)		112	115	110	113		107	110	110	110		108	105	102	100		98.0	95.0	93.0	90.0	
USD/CNY (eop)		6.89	6.78	6.65	6.51		6.28	6.67	6.80	7.00		7.00	6.80	6.60	6.50		6.5	6.4	6.4	6.3	
EUR/GBP (eop)		0.87	0.88	0.94	0.89		0.88	0.88	0.88	0.86		0.83	0.82	0.81	0.80		0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	
Brent Crude (US\$/bbl, avg)		55	51	52	61	55	67	72	70	68	69	64	66	67	66	66	61.0	66.0	71.0	66.0	66.0

¹Lower level of 25bp range; 3-month interest rate forecast based on interbank rates
Source: ING forecasts

Source: ING Global Research

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