

Good Morning Asia - 9 July 2018

A tit-for-tat trade war will hurt China's economic growth in the second quarter and will put pressure on the yuan. Japan's activity indicators have slipped from 'good' to 'mediocre', but it's unclear if this downtrend will continue.

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By Robert Carnell

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The trade war officially begins

On Friday, the US imposed tariffs on \$34 billion of Chinese goods prompting China to respond with [levies of its own](#). The US administration is keen to close the trade deficit, and it believes that imposing tariffs on China can do the trick. We don't agree with this rationale.


We expect that this is just the beginning of the trade war. The US will likely hit back, and though this may not happen immediately, it's just a matter of time. When the US does retaliate, China will too, probably without any delay. The momentum of this trade battle is controlled by the US. It can retaliate quickly to rock the market, or do so more slowly to allow investors to adjust.

Economic growth to soften in 2Q18

So how could this affect the economy? Well, tariffs don't just reduce the profit margins of exporters, they can also mean that exporters lose out on entire orders to other economies that trade similar goods. China's exports could be hit, and supply chain industries in China could be affected. This includes logistic services and packaging manufacturers, as well as the affected exporters' suppliers. This has been reflected in lower PMI readings (driven by lower export orders), which would imply lower 2H18 export activity. We suspect the negative impact from the trade war has yet to be fully reflected in the economic data.

But the threat from the trade war that has delayed investment decisions is not the only negative factor for the economy. Financial deleveraging reform is biting economic activity, especially in infrastructure investment, and therefore [we have lowered our 2Q18 GDP forecast from 6.8% YoY to 6.7%](#).

PMI shows export orders shrinking while domestic orders holding up well



Source: ING, Bloomberg

Supportive measures in 2H18 would stabilise growth

Having said that, we're still optimistic for economic growth in the second half of the year given the supportive measures being implemented by the government. Firstly, by not following the Fed in hiking the 7-day reverse repo and instead cutting the reserve ratio, the central bank (PBoC) has started to switch its monetary policy stance from tightening to loosening. These policies should help stabilise borrowing costs faced by corporates, especially SMEs, which could be hurt most by a trade war.

Secondly, there's fiscal spending, with participation in technology-related investment pools. Though these investment pools would not benefit export sectors, they would directly contribute to GDP, and raise the chances of China having its own high-tech components (for example advanced semiconductor chips) in the future.

We also expect other fiscal support - eg, restructuring the individual salary tax - to support domestic consumption, and could increase domestic sales to reduce the impact of tariffs on exports. In the past, this has not proved easy, because goods destined for export were considered to be too expensive for the domestic market. But this has changed. We expect that both the export market and the domestic market are now more compatible with an increasing middle class.

Put this all together, and our baseline case is that GDP will rise in the second half of 2018 at a rate of 6.7% year on year.

Yuan could continue to weaken as trade war continues

We have also revised our end-year [USD/CNY forecast to 7.0](#) from 6.60, and forecast the same USD/CNH as we believe the spread between CNY and CNH will continue to be small.

This revision reflects the fact that China has room to let the currency weaken by market forces in the middle of a trade war because it is opening up its market to attract more capital inflows. It reduces our previous concern that a weaker yuan would deplete foreign exchange reserves.

7.00 per dollar seems a steep depreciation but this speed is in line with [our forecasts of other Asian currencies](#). China cannot defy gravity when it comes to appreciating against other Asian currencies, especially against Japan, South Korea and Taiwan because these are competitors in electronic exports. China won't depreciate against these Asian currencies because it won't initiate a currency war in the middle of a trade war.

ING global forecasts

| | 2017 | | | | 2018F | | | | 2019F | | | | 2020F | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|-------|------|------|------|------|-------|
| | FIRST | 2Q | 3Q | 4Q | FY | 1Q | 2Q | 3Q | 4Q | FY | 1Q | 2Q | 3Q | 4Q | FY | | | | | |
| | QUA | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | RTER | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| United States | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| GDP (% QoQ, ann) | 1.2 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 2.9 | 2.3 | 2.0 | 4.0 | 3.3 | 2.3 | 2.9 | 1.5 | 2.2 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 2.2 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.7 | 1.8 |
| CPI headline (% YoY) | 2.6 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.3 | 2.7 | 2.9 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 2.1 |
| Federal funds (% eop) ¹ | 0.75 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.25 | | 1.50 | 1.75 | 2.00 | 2.25 | | 2.50 | 2.50 | 2.75 | 2.75 | | 3.00 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.00 | |
| 3-month interest rate (% eop) | 1.15 | 1.30 | 1.33 | 1.56 | | 2.30 | 2.35 | 2.62 | 2.84 | | 3.04 | 2.99 | 3.27 | 3.30 | | 3.55 | 3.72 | 3.54 | 3.46 | |
| 10-year interest rate (% eop) | 2.40 | 2.30 | 2.30 | 2.40 | | 3.00 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 3.20 | | 3.30 | 3.20 | 3.20 | 3.20 | | 3.20 | 3.10 | 3.00 | 2.90 | |
| Fiscal balance (% of GDP) | | | | | -3.5 | | | | | -4.0 | | | | | -4.7 | | | | | -5.0 |
| Fiscal thrust (% of GDP) | | | | | 0.0 | | | | | 1.4 | | | | | 0.8 | | | | | 0.4 |
| Debt held by public (% of GDP) | | | | | 76.1 | | | | | 77.3 | | | | | 79.8 | | | | | 83.0 |
| Eurozone | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| GDP (% QoQ, ann) | 2.7 | 3.0 | 2.9 | 2.8 | 2.4 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 2.0 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.2 | 0.9 | 1.6 |
| CPI headline (% YoY) | 1.5 | 1.3 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 1.7 | 2.0 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.4 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.7 |
| Refi minimum bid rate (% eop) | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.50 |
| 3-month interest rate (% eop) | -0.33 | -0.33 | -0.33 | -0.33 | | -0.33 | -0.33 | -0.33 | -0.33 | | -0.25 | -0.20 | -0.10 | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.15 | 0.30 | 0.40 | 0.50 | 0.50 |
| 10-year interest rate (% eop) | 0.45 | 0.40 | 0.45 | 0.42 | | 0.50 | 0.30 | 0.40 | 0.50 | | 0.60 | 0.70 | 0.70 | 0.80 | 0.80 | 0.90 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Fiscal balance (% of GDP) | | | | | -0.9 | | | | | -0.9 | | | | | -1.1 | | | | | -1.0 |
| Fiscal thrust (% of GDP) | | | | | 0.2 | | | | | 0.2 | | | | | 0.3 | | | | | 0.1 |
| Gross public debt/GDP (%) | | | | | 89.2 | | | | | 87.7 | | | | | 86.1 | | | | | 85.1 |
| Japan | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| GDP (% QoQ, ann) | 1.9 | 2.3 | 1.6 | 1.3 | 1.7 | -0.6 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 6.1 | -7.8 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 0.7 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 0.6 |
| CPI headline (% YoY) | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 1.3 | 0.7 | 1.0 | 0.6 | 0.9 | 0.6 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.3 | 1.8 | 2.3 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Excess reserve rate (%) | -0.1 | -0.1 | -0.1 | -0.1 | | -0.1 | -0.1 | -0.1 | -0.1 | | -0.1 | -0.1 | -0.1 | 0.0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 3-month interest rate (% eop) | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.05 | 0.1 | | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| 10-year interest rate (% eop) | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.10 | | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.10 | | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | |
| Fiscal balance (% of GDP) | | | | | -4.8 | | | | | -4.1 | | | | | -3.6 | | | | | -3.0 |
| Gross public debt/GDP (%) | | | | | 221.0 | | | | | 223.0 | | | | | 224.0 | | | | | 226.0 |
| China | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| GDP (% YoY) | 6.9 | 6.9 | 6.8 | 6.8 | 6.9 | 6.8 | 6.7 | 6.7 | 6.8 | 6.8 | 6.7 | 6.7 | 6.6 | 6.6 | 6.7 | 6.6 | 6.5 | 6.5 | 6.4 | 6.5 |
| CPI headline (% YoY) | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 1.6 | 2.5 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 1.8 | 1.7 | 2.0 |
| PBOC 7-day reverse repo rate (% eop) | 2.45 | 2.45 | 2.45 | 2.50 | | 2.55 | 2.55 | 2.55 | 2.55 | 2.55 | 2.55 | 2.60 | 2.65 | 2.70 | 2.70 | 2.70 | 2.70 | 2.70 | 2.75 | 2.75 |
| 10-year T-bond yield (% eop) | 3.29 | 3.57 | 3.61 | 3.90 | | 3.75 | 3.54 | 3.50 | 3.40 | 3.40 | 3.30 | 3.20 | 3.10 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 2.95 | 2.95 | 2.90 | 2.90 |
| Fiscal balance (% of GDP) | | | | | -3.7 | | | | | -3.5 | | | | | -3.5 | | | | | -3.5 |
| Public debt, inc local govt (% GDP) | | | | | 50.0 | | | | | 85.0 | | | | | 100 | | | | | 100 |
| UK | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| GDP (% QoQ, ann) | 1.3 | 1.0 | 1.9 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 0.9 | 1.9 | 1.5 | 1.8 | | 1.5 | 1.4 | 2.3 | 1.7 | | 2.1 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.7 | |
| CPI headline (% YoY) | 2.1 | 2.7 | 2.8 | 3.0 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 2.2 |
| BoE official bank rate (% eop) | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.75 | 0.75 | 0.75 | 0.75 | 0.75 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.25 | 1.25 | 1.50 | 1.50 | 1.50 |
| BoE Quantitative Easing (Ebn) | 445 | 445 | 445 | 445 | | 445 | 445 | 445 | 445 | 445 | 445 | 445 | 445 | 445 | 445 | 445 | 445 | 445 | 445 | 445 |
| 3-month interest rate (% eop) | 0.35 | 0.35 | 0.35 | 0.52 | | 0.60 | 0.80 | 0.80 | 0.80 | 0.80 | 0.85 | 1.05 | 1.05 | 1.05 | 1.05 | 1.30 | 1.35 | 1.60 | 1.65 | 1.65 |
| 10-year interest rate (% eop) | 1.15 | 1.10 | 1.35 | 1.20 | | 1.45 | 1.48 | 1.70 | 1.80 | 1.80 | 1.90 | 1.90 | 2.00 | 2.00 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.2 |
| Fiscal balance (% of GDP) | | | | | -2.5 | | | | | -1.8 | | | | | -1.7 | | | | | -1.4 |
| Fiscal thrust (% of GDP) | | | | | -0.5 | | | | | -0.4 | | | | | -0.4 | | | | | -0.3 |
| Gross public debt/GDP (%) | | | | | 87.0 | | | | | 86.5 | | | | | 86.0 | | | | | 85.5 |
| EUR/USD (eop) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 1.08 | 1.12 | 1.20 | 1.20 | | 1.25 | 1.17 | 1.17 | 1.23 | | 1.25 | 1.30 | 1.33 | 1.35 | | 1.36 | 1.37 | 1.38 | 1.40 | |
| USD/JPY (eop) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 112 | 115 | 110 | 113 | | 107 | 110 | 110 | 110 | | 108 | 105 | 102 | 100 | | 98.0 | 95.0 | 93.0 | 90.0 | |
| USD/CNY (eop) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 6.89 | 6.78 | 6.65 | 6.51 | | 6.28 | 6.67 | 6.80 | 7.00 | | 7.00 | 6.80 | 6.60 | 6.50 | | 6.5 | 6.4 | 6.4 | 6.3 | |
| EUR/GBP (eop) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 0.87 | 0.88 | 0.94 | 0.89 | | 0.88 | 0.88 | 0.88 | 0.86 | | 0.83 | 0.82 | 0.81 | 0.80 | | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | |
| Brent Crude (US\$/bbl, avg) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 55 | 51 | 52 | 61 | 55 | 67 | 72 | 70 | 68 | 69 | 64 | 66 | 67 | 66 | 66 | 61.0 | 66.0 | 71.0 | 66.0 | 66.0 |

¹Lower level of 25bp range; 3-month interest rate forecast based on interbank rates
Source: ING forecasts

Source: ING Global Research

[Click here to download our global forecasts](#)


Japan: Momentum slipping

Japan's activity indicators have slipped from 'good' to 'mediocre', but its unclear if this downtrend will continue



Source: istock

Tankan and GDP




Tankan survey and Japanese GDP

Japanese growth appears to have peaked in 1Q18, if the latest Tankan survey can be taken at face value, and unlike the official Japanese GDP data, it probably can. But although the headline index

fell, and by more than had been expected, there are one or two reasons not to get too downbeat about the Japanese economy just yet.

For starters, the non-manufacturing surveys- and diffusion indices for smaller firms- were a lot less negative (indeed, sometimes actually rose) than the large manufacturing series. Though this might simply be a factor of timing. Large manufacturing firms are typically more export-oriented and so have probably been more rapidly affected by plunging sentiment about trade and export orders than their more domestically-oriented and smaller suppliers and service sector support firms. Should the global trading environment worsen further - and we expect it to do so - then it is probably only a matter of time before these other firms go the same way as their larger manufacturing counterparts.

Investment intentions higher?




But don't forget investment

Investment has really picked up the pace. And the thing about investment is that when it is growing, it usually does so far faster than the underlying pace of other GDP growth, lifting other sectors in its wake.

Admittedly, the profit outlook detailed in the latest Tankan survey wasn't too impressive, but that, in turn, may reflect some higher employment and even stronger wages growth. Scheduled cash earnings in April slid back to 0.9% year on year, but this looks like noise, and the recent sharp uptrend in wages growth still looks firmly in place.

So all things considered, the Japanese outlook remains reasonably good with stronger domestic demand helping to offset what looks like an unavoidable, but moderate slowdown in the manufacturing export sector.

Scheduled cash earnings - they haven't done this for ages



Source: CEIC

Bank of Japan still hamstrung by inappropriate inflation target

All this leaves the Bank of Japan (BoJ) wrestling with a policy target that it will never reach (2.0% inflation), and the latest tick higher by the Tokyo headline CPI index leaves it barely over a quarter (0.6%YoY) of the target.

The 10-year Japanese government bond (JGB) has seen its yield slide in recent weeks, now at just 0.033%. With little pressure for yields to do anything but decline, the BoJ has continued its policy of opportunistic skipping of scheduled bond purchases and flagrant backsliding compared to its targeted pace of asset accumulation. We can only expect this backsliding to continue or even increase as time goes on.

Meanwhile, the cover the BoJ has been waiting for from the European Central Bank (ECB) tapering its policy has not been forthcoming, as clever sleight of hand by the ECB has enabled it to move towards a taper, even the end of negative deposit rates, but in such a slow and disappointing fashion in terms of foreign exchange markets, that it has provided little if any diversion for the BoJ to undertake a similar directional move. This is unlikely to change in the current environment, and we have pushed back the timing of the BoJ's own end to negative rates until 2020.

ING global forecasts

| | FIRST QUARTER | 2017 | | | | 2018F | | | | 2019F | | | | 2020F | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------------------|---------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------|------|------|------|-------|------|
| | | 2Q | 3Q | 4Q | FY | 1Q | 2Q | 3Q | 4Q | FY | 1Q | 2Q | 3Q | 4Q | FY | 1Q | 2Q | 3Q | 4Q | FY | |
| United States | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| GDP (% QoQ, ann) | | 1.2 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 2.9 | 2.3 | 2.0 | 4.0 | 3.3 | 2.3 | 2.9 | 1.5 | 2.2 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 2.2 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.7 | 1.8 |
| CPI headline (% YoY) | | 2.6 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.3 | 2.7 | 2.9 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 2.1 |
| Federal funds rate (% eop) ¹ | | 0.75 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.25 | | 1.50 | 1.75 | 2.00 | 2.25 | | 2.50 | 2.50 | 2.75 | 2.75 | | 3.00 | 3.25 | 3.25 | 3.00 | |
| 3-month interest rate (% eop) | | 1.15 | 1.30 | 1.33 | 1.56 | | 2.30 | 2.35 | 2.62 | 2.84 | | 3.04 | 2.99 | 3.27 | 3.30 | | 3.55 | 3.72 | 3.54 | 3.46 | |
| 10-year interest rate (% eop) | | 2.40 | 2.30 | 2.30 | 2.40 | | 3.00 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 3.20 | | 3.30 | 3.20 | 3.20 | 3.20 | | 3.20 | 3.10 | 3.00 | 2.90 | |
| Fiscal balance (% of GDP) | | | | | -3.5 | | | | | -4.0 | | | | | -4.7 | | | | | -5.0 | |
| Fiscal thrust (% of GDP) | | | | | 0.0 | | | | | 1.4 | | | | | 0.8 | | | | | 0.4 | |
| Debt held by public (% of GDP) | | | | | 76.1 | | | | | 77.3 | | | | | 79.8 | | | | | 83.0 | |
| Eurozone | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| GDP (% QoQ, ann) | | 2.7 | 3.0 | 2.9 | 2.8 | 2.4 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 2.0 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.2 | 0.9 | 1.6 |
| CPI headline (% YoY) | | 1.5 | 1.3 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 1.7 | 2.0 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.4 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.7 |
| Refi minimum bid rate (% eop) | | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.50 |
| 3-month interest rate (% eop) | | -0.33 | -0.33 | -0.33 | -0.33 | | -0.33 | -0.33 | -0.33 | -0.33 | | -0.25 | -0.20 | -0.10 | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.15 | 0.30 | 0.40 | 0.50 | 0.50 |
| 10-year interest rate (% eop) | | 0.45 | 0.40 | 0.45 | 0.42 | | 0.50 | 0.30 | 0.40 | 0.50 | | 0.60 | 0.70 | 0.70 | 0.80 | 0.80 | 0.90 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Fiscal balance (% of GDP) | | | | | -0.9 | | | | | -0.9 | | | | | -1.1 | | | | | -1.0 | |
| Fiscal thrust (% of GDP) | | | | | 0.2 | | | | | 0.2 | | | | | 0.3 | | | | | 0.1 | |
| Gross public debt/GDP (%) | | | | | 89.2 | | | | | 87.7 | | | | | 86.1 | | | | | 85.1 | |
| Japan | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| GDP (% QoQ, ann) | | 1.9 | 2.3 | 1.6 | 1.3 | 1.7 | -0.6 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 6.1 | -7.8 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 0.7 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 0.6 |
| CPI headline (% YoY) | | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 1.3 | 0.7 | 1.0 | 0.6 | 0.9 | 0.6 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.3 | 1.8 | 2.3 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Excess reserve rate (%) | | -0.1 | -0.1 | -0.1 | -0.1 | | -0.1 | -0.1 | -0.1 | -0.1 | | -0.1 | -0.1 | -0.1 | 0.0 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 |
| 3-month interest rate (% eop) | | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.05 | 0.1 | | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 |
| 10-year interest rate (% eop) | | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.10 | | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.10 | | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | |
| Fiscal balance (% of GDP) | | | | | -4.8 | | | | | -4.1 | | | | | -3.6 | | | | | -3.0 | |
| Gross public debt/GDP (%) | | | | | 221.0 | | | | | 223.0 | | | | | 224.0 | | | | | 226.0 | |
| China | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| GDP (% YoY) | | 6.9 | 6.9 | 6.8 | 6.8 | 6.9 | 6.8 | 6.7 | 6.7 | 6.8 | 6.8 | 6.7 | 6.7 | 6.6 | 6.6 | 6.7 | 6.6 | 6.5 | 6.5 | 6.4 | 6.5 |
| CPI headline (% YoY) | | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 1.6 | 2.5 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 1.8 | 1.7 | 2.0 |
| PBOC 7-day reverse repo rate (% eop) | | 2.45 | 2.45 | 2.45 | 2.50 | | 2.55 | 2.55 | 2.55 | 2.55 | 2.55 | 2.55 | 2.60 | 2.65 | 2.70 | 2.70 | 2.70 | 2.70 | 2.70 | 2.75 | 2.75 |
| 10-year T-bond yield (%) | | 3.29 | 3.57 | 3.61 | 3.90 | | 3.75 | 3.54 | 3.50 | 3.40 | 3.40 | 3.30 | 3.20 | 3.10 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 2.95 | 2.95 | 2.90 | 2.90 |
| Fiscal balance (% of GDP) | | | | | -3.7 | | | | | -3.5 | | | | | -3.5 | | | | | -3.5 | |
| Public debt, inc local govt (% GDP) | | | | | 50.0 | | | | | 85.0 | | | | | 100 | | | | | 100 | |
| UK | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| GDP (% QoQ, ann) | | 1.3 | 1.0 | 1.9 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 0.9 | 1.9 | 1.5 | 1.8 | | 1.5 | 1.4 | 2.3 | 1.7 | | 2.1 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.7 | |
| CPI headline (% YoY) | | 2.1 | 2.7 | 2.8 | 3.0 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 2.2 |
| BoE official bank rate (% eop) | | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.75 | 0.75 | 0.75 | 0.75 | 0.75 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.25 | 1.25 | 1.50 | 1.50 | 1.50 |
| BoE Quantitative Easing (Ebn) | | 445 | 445 | 445 | 445 | | 445 | 445 | 445 | 445 | 445 | 445 | 445 | 445 | 445 | 445 | 445 | 445 | 445 | 445 | 445 |
| 3-month interest rate (% eop) | | 0.35 | 0.35 | 0.35 | 0.52 | | 0.60 | 0.80 | 0.80 | 0.80 | 0.80 | 0.85 | 1.05 | 1.05 | 1.05 | 1.05 | 1.30 | 1.35 | 1.60 | 1.65 | 1.65 |
| 10-year interest rate (% eop) | | 1.15 | 1.10 | 1.35 | 1.20 | | 1.45 | 1.48 | 1.70 | 1.80 | 1.80 | 1.90 | 1.90 | 2.00 | 2.00 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.2 |
| Fiscal balance (% of GDP) | | | | | -2.5 | | | | | -1.8 | | | | | -1.7 | | | | | -1.4 | |
| Fiscal thrust (% of GDP) | | | | | -0.5 | | | | | -0.4 | | | | | -0.4 | | | | | -0.3 | |
| Gross public debt/GDP (%) | | | | | 87.0 | | | | | 86.5 | | | | | 86.0 | | | | | 85.5 | |
| EUR/USD (eop) | | 1.08 | 1.12 | 1.20 | 1.20 | | 1.25 | 1.17 | 1.17 | 1.23 | | 1.25 | 1.30 | 1.33 | 1.35 | | 1.36 | 1.37 | 1.38 | 1.40 | |
| USD/JPY (eop) | | 112 | 115 | 110 | 113 | | 107 | 110 | 110 | 110 | | 108 | 105 | 102 | 100 | | 98.0 | 95.0 | 93.0 | 90.0 | |
| EUR/CNY (eop) | | 6.89 | 6.78 | 6.65 | 6.51 | | 6.28 | 6.67 | 6.80 | 7.00 | | 7.00 | 6.80 | 6.60 | 6.50 | | 6.5 | 6.4 | 6.4 | 6.3 | |
| EUR/GBP (eop) | | 0.87 | 0.88 | 0.94 | 0.89 | | 0.88 | 0.88 | 0.88 | 0.86 | | 0.83 | 0.82 | 0.81 | 0.80 | | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | |
| Brent Crude (US\$/bbl, avg) | | 55 | 51 | 52 | 61 | 55 | 67 | 72 | 70 | 68 | 69 | 64 | 66 | 67 | 66 | 66 | 61.0 | 66.0 | 71.0 | 66.0 | 66.0 |

¹Lower level of 25bp range; 3-month interest rate forecast based on interbank rates
Source: ING forecasts

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