

## Good MornING Asia - 13 May 2019

The US-China trade stalemate continues to weigh on markets with all eyes now on how China retaliates to the last Friday's tariff hike by the US.

### In this bundle



#### ASEAN Morning Bytes

The US-China trade stalemate continues to weigh on markets with all eyes now on how China retaliates to the last Friday's tariff hike by the US.



#### China

#### China: Growth aids trade battle

Stronger-than-expected Chinese growth, coupled with fiscal and monetary firepower, will help authorities in trade negotiations as the tariff battle goes...



#### FX | China

#### China likely to retaliate to US tariff increase

The US increased tariffs on \$200 billion of Chinese goods to 25% on Friday. We believe that China will retaliate in kind, with \$30 billion worth of...



#### Japan

#### Japan: Mixed messages

In Japan, the macro picture paints a bit of a muddy picture. Both investment and net trade don't really help us much with the outlook for the rest of...

By Robert Carnell

Article | 13 May 2019

## ASEAN Morning Bytes

The US-China trade stalemate continues to weigh on markets with all eyes now on how China retaliates to the last Friday's tariff hike by the US.



# \$7bn

Indonesia current account deficit in 1Q19

\$1.8bn wider than year ago

Worse than expected

### EM Space: The risk-off continues

- **General Asia:** Lack of activity data and public holidays in some countries will make it a slow start of the week for Asian markets. But the risk-off continues with the escalation of US-China trade war after last Friday's move by the US to raise tariffs on Chinese goods. All eyes are on China's retaliation.
- **Indonesia:** 1Q19 current account deficit came in at \$7bn, beating the consensus estimate of \$6.2bn deficit. A \$1.8bn widening from a year ago sustains the Indonesian rupiah's vulnerability to the emerging market contagion. We believe Bank Indonesia will continue to train focus on market stability and leave policy on hold at the meeting this week (16 May).
- **Malaysia:** March industrial production surprised on the upside with 3.1% growth. However,

the average 2.7% IP growth in 1Q19 was a slowdown from 3.2% in the previous quarter and this should have dragged the GDP growth lower over the same quarters. Our forecast of a slowdown in 1Q19 GDP growth to 4.2% from 4.7% in 4Q18 remains on track. GDP data is due this week (16 May).

- **Philippines:** The markets are closed for the mid-term elections today, which is seen as a referendum on the Duterte regime. Meanwhile, the government is set to issue Panda or Chinese yuan (CNY)-denominated debt this week as part of its CNY 6bn issuance plan.

## What to look out for: Lots of trade data from Asia

- China's April economic data (15 May)
- EU revised 1Q19 GDP (15 May)
- India April trade (15 May)
- Indonesia April trade (15 May)
- Philippines March OCW remittances (15 May)
- US April retail sales and industrial production (15 May)
- Bank Indonesia policy decision (16 May)
- Malaysia 1Q19 GDP and balance of payments (16 May)
- Singapore April NODX (17 May)

### Author

#### **Alissa Lefebre**

Economist

[alissa.lefebvre@ing.com](mailto:alissa.lefebvre@ing.com)

#### **Deepali Bhargava**

Regional Head of Research, Asia-Pacific

[Deepali.Bhargava@ing.com](mailto:Deepali.Bhargava@ing.com)

#### **Ruben Dewitte**

Economist

+32495364780

[ruben.dewitte@ing.com](mailto:ruben.dewitte@ing.com)

#### **Kinga Havasi**

Economic research trainee

[kinga.havasi@ing.com](mailto:kinga.havasi@ing.com)

#### **Marten van Garderen**

Consumer Economist, Netherlands

[marten.van.garderen@ing.com](mailto:marten.van.garderen@ing.com)

#### **David Havrlant**

Chief Economist, Czech Republic

420 770 321 486

[david.havrlant@ing.com](mailto:david.havrlant@ing.com)

**Sander Burgers**

Senior Economist, Dutch Housing

[sander.burgers@ing.com](mailto:sander.burgers@ing.com)

**Lynn Song**

Chief Economist, Greater China

[lynn.song@asia.ing.com](mailto:lynn.song@asia.ing.com)

**Michiel Tukker**

Senior European Rates Strategist

[michiel.tukker@ing.com](mailto:michiel.tukker@ing.com)

**Michal Rubaszek**

Senior Economist, Poland

[michal.rubaszek@ing.pl](mailto:michal.rubaszek@ing.pl)

**This is a test author**

**Stefan Posea**

Economist, Romania

[tiberiu-stefan.posea@ing.com](mailto:tiberiu-stefan.posea@ing.com)

**Marine Leleux**

Sector Strategist, Financials

[marine.leleux2@ing.com](mailto:marine.leleux2@ing.com)

**Jesse Norcross**

Senior Sector Strategist, Real Estate

[jesse.norcross@ing.com](mailto:jesse.norcross@ing.com)

**Teise Stellema**

Research Assistant, Energy Transition

[teise.stellema@ing.com](mailto:teise.stellema@ing.com)

**Diederik Stadig**

Sector Economist, TMT & Healthcare

[diederik.stadig@ing.com](mailto:diederik.stadig@ing.com)

**Diogo Gouveia**

Sector Economist

[diogo.duarte.vieira.de.gouveia@ing.com](mailto:diogo.duarte.vieira.de.gouveia@ing.com)

**Marine Leleux**

Sector Strategist, Financials

[marine.leleux2@ing.com](mailto:marine.leleux2@ing.com)

**Ewa Manthey**

Commodities Strategist  
[ewa.manthey@ing.com](mailto:ewa.manthey@ing.com)

## ING Analysts

**James Wilson**  
EM Sovereign Strategist  
[James.wilson@ing.com](mailto:James.wilson@ing.com)

**Sophie Smith**  
Digital Editor  
[sophie.smith@ing.com](mailto:sophie.smith@ing.com)

**Frantisek Taborsky**  
EMEA FX & FI Strategist  
[frantisek.taborsky@ing.com](mailto:frantisek.taborsky@ing.com)

**Adam Antoniak**  
Senior Economist, Poland  
[adam.antoniak@ing.pl](mailto:adam.antoniak@ing.pl)

**Min Joo Kang**  
Senior Economist, South Korea and Japan  
[min.joo.kang@asia.ing.com](mailto:min.joo.kang@asia.ing.com)

**Coco Zhang**  
ESG Research  
[coco.zhang@ing.com](mailto:coco.zhang@ing.com)

**Jan Frederik Slijkerman**  
Senior Sector Strategist, TMT  
[jan.frederik.slijkerman@ing.com](mailto:jan.frederik.slijkerman@ing.com)

**Katinka Jongkind**  
Senior Economist, Services and Leisure  
[Katinka.Jongkind@ing.com](mailto:Katinka.Jongkind@ing.com)

**Marina Le Blanc**  
Sector Strategist, Financials  
[Marina.Le.Blanc@ing.com](mailto:Marina.Le.Blanc@ing.com)

**Samuel Abettan**  
Junior Economist  
[samuel.abettan@ing.com](mailto:samuel.abettan@ing.com)

**Franziska Biehl**  
Economist, Germany

[Franziska.Marie.Biehl@ing.de](mailto:Franziska.Marie.Biehl@ing.de)

**Rebecca Byrne**

Senior Editor and Supervisory Analyst

[rebecca.byrne@ing.com](mailto:rebecca.byrne@ing.com)

**Mirjam Bani**

Sector Economist, Commercial Real Estate & Public Sector (Netherlands)

[mirjam.bani@ing.com](mailto:mirjam.bani@ing.com)

**Timothy Rahill**

Credit Strategist

[timothy.rahill@ing.com](mailto:timothy.rahill@ing.com)

**Leszek Kasek**

Senior Economist, Poland

[leszek.kasek@ing.pl](mailto:leszek.kasek@ing.pl)

**Oleksiy Soroka, CFA**

Senior High Yield Credit Strategist

[oleksiy.soroka@ing.com](mailto:oleksiy.soroka@ing.com)

**Antoine Bouvet**

Head of European Rates Strategy

[antoine.bouvet@ing.com](mailto:antoine.bouvet@ing.com)

**Jeroen van den Broek**

Global Head of Sector Research

[jeroen.van.den.broek@ing.com](mailto:jeroen.van.den.broek@ing.com)

**Edse Dantuma**

Senior Sector Economist, Industry and Healthcare

[edse.dantuma@ing.com](mailto:edse.dantuma@ing.com)

**Francesco Pesole**

FX Strategist

[francesco.pesole@ing.com](mailto:francesco.pesole@ing.com)

**Rico Luman**

Senior Sector Economist, Transport and Logistics

[Rico.Luman@ing.com](mailto:Rico.Luman@ing.com)

**Jurjen Witteveen**

Sector Economist

[jurjen.witteveen@ing.com](mailto:jurjen.witteveen@ing.com)

**Dmitry Dolgin**

Chief Economist, CIS

[dmitry.dolgin@ing.de](mailto:dmitry.dolgin@ing.de)

**Nicholas Mapa**

Senior Economist, Philippines

[nicholas.antonio.mapa@asia.ing.com](mailto:nicholas.antonio.mapa@asia.ing.com)

**Egor Fedorov**

Senior Credit Analyst

[egor.fedorov@ing.com](mailto:egor.fedorov@ing.com)

**Sebastian Franke**

Consumer Economist

[sebastian.franke@ing.de](mailto:sebastian.franke@ing.de)

**Gerben Hieminga**

Senior Sector Economist, Energy

[gerben.hieminga@ing.com](mailto:gerben.hieminga@ing.com)

**Nadège Tillier**

Head of Corporates Sector Strategy

[nadege.tillier@ing.com](mailto:nadege.tillier@ing.com)

**Charlotte de Montpellier**

Senior Economist, France and Switzerland

[charlotte.de.montpellier@ing.com](mailto:charlotte.de.montpellier@ing.com)

**Laura Straeter**

Behavioural Scientist

+31(0)611172684

[laura.Straeter@ing.com](mailto:laura.Straeter@ing.com)

**Valentin Tataru**

Chief Economist, Romania

[valentin.tataru@ing.com](mailto:valentin.tataru@ing.com)

**James Smith**

Developed Markets Economist, UK

[james.smith@ing.com](mailto:james.smith@ing.com)

**Suvi Platerink Kosonen**

Senior Sector Strategist, Financials

[suvi.platerink-kosonen@ing.com](mailto:suvi.platerink-kosonen@ing.com)

**Thijs Geijer**

Senior Sector Economist, Food & Agri

[thijs.geijer@ing.com](mailto:thijs.geijer@ing.com)

**Maurice van Sante**

Senior Economist Construction & Team Lead Sectors

[maurice.van.sante@ing.com](mailto:maurice.van.sante@ing.com)

**Marcel Klok**

Senior Economist, Netherlands

[marcel.klok@ing.com](mailto:marcel.klok@ing.com)

**Piotr Poplawski**

Senior Economist, Poland

[piotr.poplawski@ing.pl](mailto:piotr.poplawski@ing.pl)

**Paolo Pizzoli**

Senior Economist, Italy, Greece

[paolo.pizzoli@ing.com](mailto:paolo.pizzoli@ing.com)

**Marieke Blom**

Chief Economist and Global Head of Research

[marieke.blom@ing.com](mailto:marieke.blom@ing.com)

**Raoul Leering**

Senior Macro Economist

[raoul.leering@ing.com](mailto:raoul.leering@ing.com)

**Maarten Leen**

Head of Global IFRS9 ME Scenarios

[maarten.leen@ing.com](mailto:maarten.leen@ing.com)

**Maureen Schuller**

Head of Financials Sector Strategy

[Maureen.Schuller@ing.com](mailto:Maureen.Schuller@ing.com)

**Warren Patterson**

Head of Commodities Strategy

[Warren.Patterson@asia.ing.com](mailto:Warren.Patterson@asia.ing.com)

**Rafal Benecki**

Chief Economist, Poland

[rafal.benecki@ing.pl](mailto:rafal.benecki@ing.pl)

**Philippe Ledent**

Senior Economist, Belgium, Luxembourg

[philippe.ledent@ing.com](mailto:philippe.ledent@ing.com)

**Peter Virovacz**

Senior Economist, Hungary

[peter.virovacz@ing.com](mailto:peter.virovacz@ing.com)

**Inga Fehner**



Senior Economist, Germany, Global Trade  
[inga.fechner@ing.de](mailto:inga.fechner@ing.de)

**Dimitry Fleming**  
Senior Data Analyst, Netherlands  
[Dimitry.Fleming@ing.com](mailto:Dimitry.Fleming@ing.com)

**Ciprian Dascalu**  
Chief Economist, Romania  
+40 31 406 8990  
[ciprian.dascalu@ing.com](mailto:ciprian.dascalu@ing.com)

**Muhammet Mercan**  
Chief Economist, Turkey  
[muhammet.mercan@ingbank.com.tr](mailto:muhammet.mercan@ingbank.com.tr)

**Iris Pang**  
Chief Economist, Greater China  
[iris.pang@asia.ing.com](mailto:iris.pang@asia.ing.com)

**Sophie Freeman**  
Writer, Group Research  
+44 20 7767 6209  
[Sophie.Freeman@uk.ing.com](mailto:Sophie.Freeman@uk.ing.com)

**Padhraic Garvey, CFA**  
Regional Head of Research, Americas  
[padhraic.garvey@ing.com](mailto:padhraic.garvey@ing.com)

**James Knightley**  
Chief International Economist, US  
[james.knightley@ing.com](mailto:james.knightley@ing.com)

**Tim Condon**  
Asia Chief Economist  
+65 6232-6020

**Martin van Vliet**  
Senior Interest Rate Strategist  
+31 20 563 8801  
[martin.van.vliet@ing.com](mailto:martin.van.vliet@ing.com)

**Robert Carnell**  
Regional Head of Research, Asia-Pacific  
[robert.carnell@asia.ing.com](mailto:robert.carnell@asia.ing.com)

**Karol Pogorzelski**  
Senior Economist, Poland

[Karol.Pogorzelski@ing.pl](mailto:Karol.Pogorzelski@ing.pl)

**Carsten Brzeski**

Global Head of Macro

[carsten.brzeski@ing.de](mailto:carsten.brzeski@ing.de)

**Viraj Patel**

Foreign Exchange Strategist

+44 20 7767 6405

[viraj.patel@ing.com](mailto:viraj.patel@ing.com)

**Owen Thomas**

Global Head of Editorial Content

+44 (0) 207 767 5331

[owen.thomas@ing.com](mailto:owen.thomas@ing.com)

**Bert Colijn**

Chief Economist, Netherlands

[bert.colijn@ing.com](mailto:bert.colijn@ing.com)

**Peter Vanden Houte**

Chief Economist, Belgium, Luxembourg, Eurozone

[peter.vandenhoute@ing.com](mailto:peter.vandenhoute@ing.com)

**Benjamin Schroeder**

Senior Rates Strategist

[benjamin.schroeder@ing.com](mailto:benjamin.schroeder@ing.com)

**Chris Turner**

Global Head of Markets and Regional Head of Research for UK & CEE

[chris.turner@ing.com](mailto:chris.turner@ing.com)

**Gustavo Rangel**

Chief Economist, LATAM

+1 646 424 6464

[gustavo.rangel@ing.com](mailto:gustavo.rangel@ing.com)

**Carlo Cocuzzo**

Economist, Digital Finance

+44 20 7767 5306

[carlo.cocuzzo@ing.com](mailto:carlo.cocuzzo@ing.com)

## China: Growth aids trade battle

Stronger-than-expected Chinese growth, coupled with fiscal and monetary firepower, will help authorities in trade negotiations as the tariff battle goes up a notch



The Chinese Vice Premier, Liu He, in Washington during trade talks between the United States and China

### Stronger growth will help China, but trade isn't the only factor in US talks

Last month, we noted that China has enjoyed a recovery created by fiscal stimulus and monetary easing. This was demonstrated by the recent GDP figures, where first-quarter growth matched the 6.4% YoY pace seen in 4Q18. Stronger-than-expected economic growth should provide the Chinese government with extra chips when it comes to renegotiating the terms of a draft trade deal with the US.

---

*For China, the cost of confronting the US is more broad-based than trade*

---


The latest turning point in the trade negotiations appears to have been triggered by disagreements over a reciprocal penalty system. But for China, the cost of confronting the US is more broad-based

than trade. The US, along with some of its allies, have aired concern over the use of Chinese-made 5G equipment. Equally, tensions have risen in the South China Sea. If China successfully renegotiates, then it has the potential to reduce some of these risks.

If China renegotiates successfully then the potential risks on 5G exports and geopolitical tension around the South China Sea will be reduced.

But let's not forget, China's negotiation chips come from fiscal stimulus and monetary easing. Domestic consumption, as reflected in retail sales, is not as bright as it seems. China may need even more fiscal stimulus and monetary easing to support a possible long-running renegotiation.

## Chinese GDP is supported by “consumption” from government



Source: Bloomberg, ING


## Recent actions show willingness of government to easy policy further

On the same day that the US revealed China has started renegotiating, the Chinese central bank, PBoC, restructured the system of required reserve ratios for small agricultural commercial banks. Though the extra liquidity released is a small drop of CNY280 billion out of an M2 money supply of CNY188,941 billion, it is a symbolic move that shows the willingness of the Chinese government to ease even further.

We keep our forecast for USD/CNY and USD/CNH at 6.75. But we have revised the 2Q and 3Q forecasts to 6.75 and 6.80 from 6.85. A big yuan depreciation when the trade war escalates could easily send an incorrect signal to the market that there are risks of capital flight. We have therefore kept our forecasts of USDCNY and USDCNH in a narrow range. We also keep GDP forecasts at 6.2%YoY in 2Q19 and 6.3% for 2019.

This article forms part of our Monthly Economic Update which you can find [here](#)

## Consumers have been careful when it comes to spending



Source: Bloomberg, ING

### Author


**Iris Pang**

Chief Economist, Greater China

[iris.pang@asia.ing.com](mailto:iris.pang@asia.ing.com)

# China likely to retaliate to US tariff increase

The US increased tariffs on \$200 billion of Chinese goods to 25% on Friday. We believe that China will retaliate in kind, with \$30 billion worth of tariffs on US goods. This could happen either today or tomorrow. But it will become increasingly difficult for China to respond to a further round of tariff hikes



Source: Shutterstock

## Retaliation from China is highly expected

We believe China will retaliate in kind, with \$30 billion worth of tariffs on US goods, the amount that the US has increased tariffs on Chinese goods today. This could be announced during a regular media briefing in the afternoon. China could also delay this tariff until Vice Premier Liu He returns to China tomorrow. In any event, this will happen very soon.

## But how can China retaliate in kind if US imposes 25% tariffs on remaining goods

It is very difficult for China to retaliate in kind if the US imposes 25% tariffs on the remaining goods (about \$289.5 billion, according to [US data](#)).

What we expect is that China will apply a mix of tools to penalise the US:

- First, it will impose higher tariffs on most US goods shipped to China. But this won't make up the whole amount of tariffs imposed by the US on Chinese goods.
- Second, it will make life more difficult for US companies operating in China, possibly by stepping into M&A deals in China

However, we do not expect China to sell US Treasuries. This is a tool that China will save as a last resort, and it may not even be used in the unlikely event of a breakdown in the trade negotiations.

## **USDCNY is less affected but USDCNH more volatile**

The yuan will be little affected by this, as the news has been expected for a few days and has already digested by the market.

In fact, the volatility decreased after the US imposed the additional tariffs on China.

We believe the yuan, USD/CNY, will continue to remain calm while USD/CNH could be more volatile. We expect that both yuan exchange rates will head to 6.75 by the end of 1H19.

### **Author**

#### **Iris Pang**

Chief Economist, Greater China

[iris.pang@asia.ing.com](mailto:iris.pang@asia.ing.com)

## Japan: Mixed messages

In Japan, the macro picture paints a bit of a muddy picture. Both investment and net trade don't really help us much with the outlook for the rest of the year, and we aren't particularly sure whether the anticipated 1Q19 GDP (around 1%) would be a good or bad result



### No questions answered

From a purely macro perspective, the last month has answered no questions about the trajectory of Japan's economy. Indeed, to the contrary, the picture is less clear than it has been for some time.

We are approaching the release of 1Q19 GDP data, which means that we have near-complete, and semi-complete high-frequency data for most of the subcomponents of GDP, as well as for inflation. The story is as follows:

1Q19 GDP may not look too bad at first glance; we are looking for something around 1.1% at a seasonally adjusted annualised rate. That would follow a 1.9% rate in 4Q18, so looks decent, albeit perhaps indicative of a slight moderation in pace.

But Japanese GDP can't really be taken so literally, and is also prone to huge revisions, so aside from saying it is likely to be slower in 1Q19 than 4Q18, we can't confidently say much more at this stage.




## Many mixed signals

Within this total are some real “head-scratchers”. For example, private consumer spending looks as if it could register a healthy 2% pace. But cash earnings, which had been providing some lift to the household sector, have recently crashed to low sub-1% levels, and this does not look sustainable.

On the investment side, residential investment seems to be undergoing something of a boom, prompting questions about the Bank of Japan’s purchasing of real estate investment trusts (JREITS). Business investment in plant, machinery and non-residential construction looks terrible in contrast, so the net investment picture will be determined by a largely unforecastable horse race between these two components.

## Business investment (in GDP) and machine orders



Source: CEIC, ING

## Don't expect any big economic rebound

Net trade is another source of considerable uncertainty. We know that exports have been badly hit by the slowdown in global trade, the US-China trade war and the global tech slump, not to mention the slump in the auto sector. What we can't say with any precision is how this plays off against what also looks to have been a very weak quarter for imports, and whether this has led to a surge in inventories, or has been accompanied by destocking from previous inventory accumulation. We have opted for the latter, but inventories are often calculated residually by statistical agencies, so we have no confidence that this will actually turn out as forecast.

---

*Exports are very weak, but net trade is harder to call, or how this impacts inventories*

---

Putting this all together, it is very hard to characterise whether 1.1% is a good or a bad result for Japan, even if this is close to the figure that eventually gets published. It certainly doesn't set the economy up for a big rebound in 2Q19, but it isn't particularly worrying either.

Inflation did nudge a little higher in March, though this coincided with a further tweak to Bank of

Japan (BoJ) forward guidance that to paraphrase, guarantees no tightening of policy until at least Spring 2020, and probably not then either. This, according to BoJ was to offset misperceptions about their intentions. We don't believe there were any. But in any case, it won't help the BoJ achieve their inflation target, and even they seem to have given up on it if recent economic projections are to be taken at face value.

This article forms part of our Monthly Economic Update which you can find [here](#)

## Author

### Robert Carnell

Regional Head of Research, Asia-Pacific

[robert.carnell@asia.ing.com](mailto:robert.carnell@asia.ing.com)

## Disclaimer

This publication has been prepared by the Economic and Financial Analysis Division of ING Bank N.V. ("ING") solely for information purposes without regard to any particular user's investment objectives, financial situation, or means. *ING forms part of ING Group (being for this purpose ING Group N.V. and its subsidiary and affiliated companies)*. The information in the publication is not an investment recommendation and it is not investment, legal or tax advice or an offer or solicitation to purchase or sell any financial instrument. Reasonable care has been taken to ensure that this publication is not untrue or misleading when published, but ING does not represent that it is accurate or complete. ING does not accept any liability for any direct, indirect or consequential loss arising from any use of this publication. Unless otherwise stated, any views, forecasts, or estimates are solely those of the author(s), as of the date of the publication and are subject to change without notice.

The distribution of this publication may be restricted by law or regulation in different jurisdictions and persons into whose possession this publication comes should inform themselves about, and observe, such restrictions.

Copyright and database rights protection exists in this report and it may not be reproduced, distributed or published by any person for any purpose without the prior express consent of ING. All rights are reserved. ING Bank N.V. is authorised by the Dutch Central Bank and supervised by the European Central Bank (ECB), the Dutch Central Bank (DNB) and the Dutch Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM). ING Bank N.V. is incorporated in the Netherlands (Trade Register no. 33031431 Amsterdam). In the United Kingdom this information is approved and/or communicated by ING Bank N.V., London Branch. ING Bank N.V., London Branch is authorised by the Prudential Regulation Authority and is subject to regulation by the Financial Conduct Authority and limited regulation by the Prudential Regulation Authority. ING Bank N.V., London branch is registered in England (Registration number BR000341) at 8-10 Moorgate, London EC2 6DA. For US Investors: Any person wishing to discuss this report or effect transactions in any security discussed herein should contact ING Financial Markets LLC, which is a member of the NYSE, FINRA and SIPC and part of ING, and which has accepted responsibility for the distribution of this report in the United States under applicable requirements.

Additional information is available on request. For more information about ING Group, please visit [www.ing.com](http://www.ing.com).