

UK Economic and Brexit Update

With a trade deal hanging in the balance, we examine the key sticking points in UK-EU negotiations, areas for possible compromise and ramifications for the British economy



Source: Shutterstock

Key takeaways

- **Brexit:** A deal is now at best a 50:50 probability. The key factor will be whether the Internal Market Bill makes its way through the Commons and Lords successfully. If so, the EU is highly unlikely to sign a free-trade agreement with the UK given the lack of trust, and threat of withdrawal agreement breach. However a deal shouldn't be completely ruled out, and is still possible if the bill fails/is watered down, but would require the UK to reluctantly relax its red line on state aid. It's clear the government won't do a deal at any cost.
- **Economy:** We expect a 17% jump in UK GDP in the third quarter, but this will still leave the economy some 8% below pre-virus levels. The recovery looks set to stall with unemployment expected to rise to 8-9% by year-end.
- **Bank of England:** Further QE round is likely in November. Negative rates are still a possibility, but we think policymakers are more likely to lower the rate on the Term Funding Scheme for SMEs as a first step.
- **Covid-19:** The UK's testing system has been comparatively stronger than many in Europe on a per capita basis. This has helped to keep transmission contained over the summer although cracks are starting to appear. For now, the government is likely to prioritise limiting gatherings over re-closing parts of the economy as cases begin to rise.
- **Markets:** Despite a slide recent sterling slide, a lack of risk-premium embedded into EUR/GBP and neutral speculative positioning suggests further downside potential. 'No deal' could see EUR/GBP head above this year's high of 0.95 and potentially toward parity.


Is a deal still possible? At best, we think it's 50:50 now...

- The bold nature of the Internal Market Bill has led many to conclude this is designed to inject pressure, or a sense of crisis, into talks to try and generate movement.
- It has drawn comparisons to 2019, when Parliament was prorogued (also ruled unlawful).
- But the move will reduce trust between negotiators. The EU won't agree to a new deal if there is any risk of the Withdrawal Agreement being breached, and may look at legal action if the bill is passed.
- Key question now is whether this legislation passes through Parliament. There is talk of amendments, although unlike last year the government has an ample majority in the House of Commons. It may, however, face trouble in the House of Lords.
- A deal is still possible, if the legislation fails to pass or is watered down. But even then it would require a compromise on 'state aid', and current UK rhetoric suggests it is highly reluctant to do so.
- If the bill passes, then it looks increasingly likely that 'no deal' will be the most likely scenario.

What is the Internal Market Bill and why has it come about?

- State aid has long been the key dividing issue in negotiations. The UK wants full control to support industries in future. The EU wants reassurance, perhaps in the form of an independent regulator, that the UK won't abuse these powers and put European firms at a disadvantage.
- However the Northern Ireland Protocol (i.e. the backstop) says the UK must abide by EU state aid rules where it might affect NI-EU trade – something that is potentially far reaching.
- The UK government is therefore proposing to give ministers power to override this requirement, as well as on export summary declarations for goods leaving NI, and on the need for tariff payments on goods crossing the Irish sea.
- This is widely interpreted as a breach of international law

Trade timeline: Key dates surrounding UK-EU negotiations



What needs to happen for a deal to be done?

Issue	Possible compromise	Likelihood of agreement
State aid	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Brussels drops insistence that the UK signs up to EU state aid rules with ECJ oversight permanently. • Britain sets up independent regulator to enforce a set of limits/rules on UK state aid, that EU leaders are satisfied won't lead to unfair competition. • This will take time to set-up, so in the meantime the EU may insist on a transition where UK continues to follow its rules with ECJ oversight 	<p>Questionable given Internal Market Bill</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UK adamant it wants control over state aid, and has gone further by proposing to override these provisions in the Withdrawal Agreement.
Fishing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Both sides drop initial proposals (EU maintaining status quo, UK wanting control over its waters). • It'll be a question of quotas, and how often these are renegotiated in future years. 	<p>Possible – but only if wider deal reached</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UK exports majority of its fish, while EU fishing communities rely on access to UK waters. • A deal makes economic sense for both sides but would likely be the last thing to be agreed
Equivalence for financial services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 'Enhanced' equivalence regime unlikely (the EU would need to offer this to other FTA partners) • The EU has signalled flux in its own rules may mean an equivalence assessment covering all areas may not be possible this year. 	<p>Likely if there's a deal – although scope unclear</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • While this is largely a technical, and unilateral, EU matter, agreement on a wider FTA would likely add political impetus for equivalence to be resolved.
Other issues	<p>Governance</p> <p>UK uneasy about EU proposal for one overarching deal, enabling future sanctions that could link different areas</p> <p>Border bureaucracy</p> <p>Transit rights for lorry drivers, lower frequency of checks (eg for agri/animal), trusted trade schemes etc</p>	<p>Data sharing</p> <p>Data adequacy ruling likely, but concerns about future legal challenges</p>

What does the new UK-EU relationship mean for 2021 growth?

We are unlikely to see a Covid-19 style collapse in GDP at the start of 2021. We'd need to see consumer spending fall for this to happen, and that's unlikely to be a direct consequence of the transition period ending.

But unlike the pandemic, Brexit is a more permanent drag on UK activity. Higher costs will hit firms, and this will compound the damage done by Covid-19 (see examples to the right).

The effect is likely to be a slower recovery relative to comparable European peers. It could also put additional strain on unemployment if the challenges broaden out to a wider range of sectors than those directly hit by the pandemic. We think it is likely that unemployment will reach 9% by late 2020/early 2021

Brexit will hit some sectors less affected so far by the pandemic

Example: **Agriculture**

Covid-19 impact: Production fell by only 5% in the second quarter, compared to 20% for the wider economy

Brexit impact: Typically the highest tariffs (30%+ for dairy/meat). Subject to more intrusive (health) checks at borders compared to other goods

For sectors already hard hit, Brexit will compound existing costs


Example: **Car manufacturing**

Covid-19 impact: Production fell by 70% in second quarter


Brexit impact: 10% tariff if no FTA in place. But also vulnerable to disruption at the ports given just-in-time production. Could stockpile to compensate, but that's costly and many firms (especially SMEs in the supply chain) won't have resources

Mapping the next phase of the economic recovery


Phase 1: Covid-19 spread before vaccine



Phase 2: Vaccine development and roll-out



Three scenarios for the UK economy



Author

James Smith

Developed Markets Economist, UK

james.smith@ing.com

Disclaimer

This publication has been prepared by the Economic and Financial Analysis Division of ING Bank N.V. (“ING”) solely for information purposes without regard to any particular user’s investment objectives, financial situation, or means. *ING forms part of ING Group (being for this purpose ING Group N.V. and its subsidiary and affiliated companies)*. The information in the publication is not an investment recommendation and it is not investment, legal or tax advice or an offer or solicitation to purchase or sell any financial instrument. Reasonable care has been taken to ensure that this publication is not untrue or misleading when published, but ING does not represent that it is accurate or complete. ING does not accept any liability for any direct, indirect or consequential loss arising from any use of this publication. Unless otherwise stated, any views, forecasts, or estimates are solely those of the author(s), as of the date of the publication and are subject to change without notice.

The distribution of this publication may be restricted by law or regulation in different jurisdictions and persons into whose possession this publication comes should inform themselves about, and observe, such restrictions.

Copyright and database rights protection exists in this report and it may not be reproduced, distributed or published by any person for any purpose without the prior express consent of ING. All rights are reserved. ING Bank N.V. is authorised by the Dutch Central Bank and supervised by the European Central Bank (ECB), the Dutch Central Bank (DNB) and the Dutch Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM). ING Bank N.V. is incorporated in the Netherlands (Trade Register no. 33031431 Amsterdam). In the United Kingdom this information is approved and/or communicated by ING Bank N.V., London Branch. ING Bank N.V., London Branch is authorised by the Prudential Regulation Authority and is subject to regulation by the Financial Conduct Authority and limited regulation by the Prudential Regulation Authority. ING Bank N.V., London branch is registered in England (Registration number BR000341) at 8-10 Moorgate, London EC2 6DA. For US Investors: Any person wishing to discuss this report or effect transactions in any security discussed herein should contact ING Financial Markets LLC, which is a member of the NYSE, FINRA and SIPC and part of ING, and which has accepted responsibility for the distribution of this report in the United States under applicable requirements.

Additional information is available on request. For more information about ING Group, please visit www.ing.com.