

Rates Spark

Rates Spark: Three times policy error

Rates continue to gyrate, with all major curves – US, EU and UK – reflattening as the front-end price in further tightening and the backend rates move lower. More tightening now, requires less later. UK takes the lead with BoE seen hiking next month, but the seesaw between front-end and back-end rates also suggests that a policy error narrative is in play



US belly gets ever cheaper as the wind-up to an eventual hike continues

The positioning of the 5yr area on the US curve versus the 2yr and 10yr is now back to the levels last seen in 2016, on the eve of a series of multi-year rate hikes from the Federal Reserve. The curve is getting into prep mode for an eventual hike. A continued cheapening of the belly is likely in the near term, characterised by a relative flattening on the 5/30yr segment. But it's too early for this to be a structural thing. Some tactical re-steepening on this segment is very likely, as the curve faces into a very sticky inflation story.

The curve is getting into prep mode for an eventual hike

The next big step in this process would be for the steepening on the 2/5yr segment to morph into a flattening, as the 2yr yield shoots higher. This would make complete sense where a hike is expected within the next 3 months or so. We are not quite that close to a hike yet, so a 2yr convergence on the 50bp area would be enough at this juncture.



As hikes are brought forward, 2s5s will re-flatten

The missing element is that longer end rates are still not high enough to be fully prepared for a material series of interest rate hikes. The 10yr should ideally be closer to 2% for the runway to be set for a series of hikes. In consequence, the curve has upward potential, and in fact a tactical resteepening one. Otherwise, the rate hike ambition cannot be realised.

UK front end displays a telling hump

More policy tightening earlier on will require less tightening later can be one way of explaining the 5s30s curve re-flattening, as central banks are seen countering inflationary pressures more aggressively.

The Bank of England Governor Bailey said "monetary policy will have to act", looking at the frontend pricing in GBP, and reinforcing the argument that the BoE is seen as the closest to tightening policies. This strikingly illustrates the other narrative: Central banks are close to committing a policy error. Why else would the market see the BoE hike rates more than 100bp by the end of next year, only to start lowering them in the years thereafter?

Implied forward Sonia fixings (%) 1.4 Change in 2022: 1.2 75bp Change in Change in 2026: 2025: -5bp 1 Change in 2023: 4bp Change in 2024: -9bp 0.8 -17bp 0.6 0.4 Change in 2021 41bp 0.2 0 2027 2021 2022 2024 2025 2026 2023 05/08/2021 -06/05/2021 - 19/10/2021 _ Source: Refinitiv. ING

The Sonia curve is pricing the BoE cutting rates back after 2022

Our UK economist has doubts about the BoE's ability to hike as quickly beyond the first move that is now priced

Keep in mind what this implies for the BoE's balance sheet. At a bank rate of 0.5%, the BoE indicated that it would stop reinvestments. At a level of 1%, policymakers have indicated they will start actively reducing the balance sheet, i.e. selling assets back into the market. All else being equal, that should be an argument to see also long-end rates rise given the additional tightening it implies. That said, our UK economist has doubts about the BoE's ability to hike as quickly beyond the first move that is now priced.

EUR curve jumping ahead of the conclusion

In the Eurozone, front-end pricing appears to be getting ahead of itself as well given the European Central Bank's own forward guidance. That is at least relating to the near future of say 2022 and where more than 10bp of tightening is currently priced. Some of that may just be cross-market spill-over effects from what is seen in the US and UK. But also the undertone of ECB policymakers recent comments, suggest an increasing worry about an inflation overshoot.

The ECB is reducing purchases and its now more a matter of how to buffer some of the impact

Our thinking is that the exit strategy should in the first instance impact the expected speed of a wind-down of the asset purchase programmes. And indeed, that seems to be the focus of many ECB officials judged with many opinions voiced on keeping the PEPP flexibility or how to tweak certain allocations to supranationals, for instance, as reported yesterday. The upshot is, the ECB is reducing purchases and it's now more a matter of how to buffer some of the impacts. That a substantial reduction of purchases is looming should be clear. In theory, this should register in

higher long-end rates, bond underperformance versus swaps and wider sovereign periphery spreads over Bunds. None of that is to be seen currently.

It is even more surprising – or even worrying if one considers the outlook this implies – to see the long end dropping, considering how very subdued levels EU rates are to start with compared to the US and UK. That alone would suggest that EUR curves should be more inclined to steepen first before patterns that are usually more typical for a later stage in the cycle, set in.

Today's events and market view

The data calendar is relatively quiet, but sees public appearances of quite a few central bank speakers. Speaking agendas suggest focus away from imminent monetary policy decisions. Given the proximity of the next ECB and especially BoE meeting, the market is prone to headline risks. While it appears the market has increasingly made up its mind given how far we have come in valuations, some inconsistencies in our view – see for instance in EUR as outlined above – suggest potential for reversals.

The US sees housing data and a busy slate of Fed speakers including Daly, Barkin and Bostic ("transitory is a dirty word").

Authors

Padhraic Garvey, CFA Regional Head of Research, Americas padhraic.garvey@ing.com

Benjamin Schroeder Senior Rates Strategist benjamin.schroder@ing.com

Disclaimer

This publication has been prepared by the Economic and Financial Analysis Division of ING Bank N.V. ("**ING**") solely for information purposes without regard to any particular user's investment objectives, financial situation, or means. *ING forms part of ING Group (being for this purpose ING Group N.V. and its subsidiary and affiliated companies)*. The information in the publication is not an investment recommendation and it is not investment, legal or tax advice or an offer or solicitation to purchase or sell any financial instrument. Reasonable care has been taken to ensure that this publication is not untrue or misleading when published, but ING does not represent that it is accurate or complete. ING does not accept any liability for any direct, indirect or consequential loss arising from any use of this publication. Unless otherwise stated, any views, forecasts, or estimates are solely those of the author(s), as of the date of the publication and are subject to change without notice.

The distribution of this publication may be restricted by law or regulation in different jurisdictions and persons into whose possession this publication comes should inform themselves about, and observe, such restrictions.

Copyright and database rights protection exists in this report and it may not be reproduced, distributed or published by any person for any purpose without the prior express consent of ING. All rights are reserved. ING Bank N.V. is authorised by the Dutch Central Bank and supervised by the European Central Bank (ECB), the Dutch Central Bank (DNB) and the Dutch Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM). ING Bank N.V. is incorporated in the Netherlands (Trade Register no. 33031431 Amsterdam). In the United Kingdom this information is approved and/or communicated by ING Bank N.V., London Branch. ING Bank N.V., London Branch is authorised by the Prudential Regulation Authority and is subject to regulation by the Financial Conduct Authority and limited regulation by the Prudential Regulation Authority. ING Bank N.V., London branch is registered in England (Registration number BR000341) at 8-10 Moorgate, London EC2 6DA. For US Investors: Any person wishing to discuss this report or effect transactions in any security discussed herein should contact ING Financial Markets LLC, which is a member of the NYSE, FINRA and SIPC and part of ING, and which has accepted responsibility for the distribution of this report in the United States under applicable requirements.

Additional information is available on request. For more information about ING Group, please visit http://www.ing.com.