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**Financial Institutions** 

# ECB decision time: For banks, more deposit tiering as low TLTRO rate ends

By June 2022, the favourable borrowing rate on the Eurosystem's TLTRO operations will end and we do not expect an extension. To somewhat mitigate the considerable impact on eurozone banks, we expect the ECB to tweak the deposit tiering multiplier until policy rate hikes arrive in 2023



The ECB headquarters in Frankfurt

# The end of TLTRO favourable rates is moving into view

What's to become of the TLTROs, the <u>Targeted Longer-term Refinancing Operations</u>? They're likely to be on the table at the 'big bang' meeting and the Eurosystem will particularly be looking at the expiry of the -100bp favourable rate on 23 June 2022. To mitigate the impact of this expiry on banks, we expect an increase to the deposit tiering multiplier (set at the initial value of 6 in September 2019, and not modified since), until the deposit facility rate returns to zero (which we expect to happen in late 2023), removing the need for such measures.

This is a rather complicated story, so bear with us. The rate on banks' TLTRO borrowing from the ECB has been made dependent on their lending to the real economy, in particular to businesses. If lending exceeds a benchmark, banks qualify for a borrowing rate as favourable as -100bp. The last favourable rate period runs from July 2021 to June 2022. Unless the ECB announces new

modifications to TLTRO conditions (which we do not expect), the borrowing rate will increase to, at best, the deposit facility rate which is currently -50bp.

The end of the favourable TLTRO rate would lower Eurozone banks' negative rate revenues by about €950m per month

Banks have, especially over the past 1.5 years, borrowed significant amounts under the TLTRO. The ECB currently has €2287bn of TLTRO loans outstanding (note that the tenth and last tranche is concluded next week, with allotment announced on 16 December; <u>we expect this to be one of the smaller tranches</u>). The end of the favourable TLTRO rate would lower TLTRO negative rate revenues for eurozone banks by about €950m every month. That significant change in itself might already be a reason for the Eurosystem to take a look.

But there's more. Ending the TLTRO favourable rates brings back another issue: the considerable negative rate costs imposed on the banking system by the Eurosystem's asset purchases. This requires some explanation.

# ? How Eurosystem asset purchases cause reserves that banks cannot avoid


Both ECB TLTRO loans and ECB asset purchases necessarily lead to increased deposits (or "reserves") held by commercial banks at the ECB. This is a simple consequence of doubleentry bookkeeping: both TLTRO loans and asset purchases increase the Eurosystem's assets, and increased deposits are the corresponding Eurosystem liability that increases in tandem. These Eurosystem deposit liabilities, or bank reserves, have carried a negative deposit facility rate charge of -50bp since September 2019.

Insofar as Eurosystem deposit liabilities are caused by asset purchases, the banking sector has no way to avoid them. An individual bank may try and reduce its reserves, for instance by substituting into bonds. But this will only offload reserves to another bank. Total reserves in the system are a given for banks. The collective banking sector cannot avoid or reduce these reserves, because the Eurosystem drives them with their asset purchases.

The unavoidable nature of reserves does not apply to those reserves that are created by TLTROs. In those cases, banks deliberately choose to take out a TLTRO loan. The associated reserves may and do however end up at other banks.

Back in 2019, the ECB acknowledged that imposing a negative rate on reserves that the banking sector cannot avoid may not be fair. Hence the ECB implemented a "deposit tiering multiplier". Initially set at 6, this means that since late 2019, an amount of 6 times required reserves, plus required reserves themselves, are exempt from negative deposit facility rate charges. When this tiering came into force, it reduced the negative rate cost of bank reserves by about €350m each month. See the light orange area in the chart below, and this article for more on involuntary

reserves and deposit tiering.



# Eurosystem liquidity supply and absorption (€ trillion)


Since late 2019, both Eurosystem asset purchases and TLTRO lending have increased dramatically. Bank reserves have increased with them by an eye-watering 145%, from about €1850bn in October 2019 to over €4500bn today (see the orange area in chart). The increased reserves have driven up negative rate expenses for banks. Yet these are, in aggregate, more than compensated by the favourable ⊠100bp borrowing rate that most banks will qualify for. The ECB did not, therefore, think it necessary to revisit the deposit tiering calibration, even though the aggregate numbers hide substantial redistributive effects between eurozone banks, as both TLTRO borrowing and reserve holdings differ (we describe the redistributive effects <u>here</u>).

Moreover, this constellation of policies did muddy TLTRO goals: apart from their official goal to "preserve favourable borrowing conditions for banks and stimulate bank lending to the real economy", TLTROs have simultaneously become an instrument to mitigate the negative rate costs imposed on banks as a result of asset purchases.

# From a €300m monthly net gain to a €700m monthly net loss in July 2022

The mixing of TLTRO policy goals becomes a problem when, in July 2022, the favourable TLTRO borrowing rate ends. Extending the favourable rate may not be needed to stimulate bank lending, but what about the hugely increased asset purchases and the much higher negative rate cost the associated reserves impose on banks? These have gone from a monthly €120m after tiering was enacted in late 2019, to over €500m per month now, and may surpass €700m/month in July 2022. That's shown in the blue area in the chart below. The chart also shows the other negative rate revenues and expenses for the eurozone banking sector, under our base scenario of tapering after March 2022, and a first deposit facility rate increase in the first quarter of 2023, and furthermore assuming no net changes to TLTRO holdings compared to today (except for redemption at maturity).

Eurozone banks' monthly negative rate expenses and revenues on ECB reserves and TLTROs



The monthly negative rate costs of reserves (the blue plus grey areas in our chart) are currently more than compensated by TLTRO borrowing rate revenues which are shown in the green area. This results in a projected monthly net negative rate revenue of  $\in$ 300m in June 2022 (the orange line). When the TLTRO favourable rate ends and no other measures are taken, the net monthly result abruptly turns negative to the tune of - $\notin$ 700m.

Some banks will be hit harder than others

Given the uneven distribution of TLTROs borrowing and reserve holdings over eurozone countries, some banks will be hit harder than others. The Italian and Spanish banking sectors manage to just keep net positive negative rate revenues, while banking sectors in Germany, France, Netherlands Belgium and elsewhere start to incur negative rate net costs again. Upon our assumed 25bp increase in the deposit facility rate in the first quarter of 2023, net negative rate costs halve.



### Monthly net negative rate revenue/expense per country

We made some further calculations to see what changes to the deposit tiering framework would

What the ECB could do to dampen the impact in July 2022

be needed to mitigate the impact of the end of the -100bp favourable TLTRO rate on banks. The change in the multiplier needed to fully undo the aggregated impact would not qualify as just a tweak. Even doubling the multiplier, from the current 6 to 12 times required reserves being exempt from negative rates, would leave banks barely in a better position than where they were in September 2019. Note that the ECB should not be satisfied by just restoring the September 2019 situation in terms of costs imposed on the banking sector, because that is when the ECB decided to start deposit tiering in the first place.

# *Even under a multiplier of 15, some banks would continue to incur significant net negative rate costs*

We can also calculate the multiplier that would reduce negative rate costs to what they were in the last quarter of 2019 under the assumption the ECB considered them satisfactory. These amounted to €125m/month. To get there, the tiering multiplier would need to be cranked up to 15. That sounds like a lot, and it is, but it would still exempt only half of ECB reserves of negative rates. It is also important to note that this tiering would reduce, but not eliminate the redistributive effects of the negative deposit rate. Even under a multiplier of 15, banks in e.g. Germany and France would continue to incur significant net negative rate costs, while those in Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece would continue to make net negative rate revenues. This is due to the fact that banks in the latter group would continue to receive the full -50bp negative rate on their TLTRO borrowing, while some of the corresponding reserves have ended up with the former group, absorbing the -50bp deposit rate. There is little that generic deposit tiering can do about this.

## A tweak to the deposit tiering multiplier as a temporary fix

As the favourable TLTRO rate expires in June 2022, eurozone banks face a strong hike in negative rate costs. This will last until the deposit facility rate is increased to zero, which we pencil in for the end of 2023. In the meantime, we don't expect a prolongation of the favourable TLTRO borrowing rate. The deposit tiering multiplier is the easiest tool for the ECB to turn to, but it has its shortcomings. For one, it would need to be increased very significantly to fully compensate banks. It would also leave the sizeable redistribution among eurozone banks unaddressed as some of the funds borrowed under TLTROs have been flowing from southern Europe towards the north. This will self-correct when TLTRO funds are repaid which will take time (the last TLTROs are scheduled to mature in 2024).

With deposit facility rate increases emerging on the horizon, the negative rate costs imposed on banks by the ECB's asset purchases will be of a temporary nature. We, therefore, expect the ECB to settle for a modest deposit tiering multiplier increase only, from 6 to 10. This will fall far short of compensating the increase in net negative rate costs many banks will experience, but will at least remove the sharpest edges. It would lower negative rate costs for northern eurozone banks by about 25%, compared to the no-multiplier-tweak scenario depicted in the chart above.

#### Author

Amrita Naik Nimbalkar Junior Economist, Global Macro amrita.naik.nimbalkar@ing.com

Mateusz Sutowicz Senior Economist, Poland mateusz.sutowicz@ing.pl

Alissa Lefebre Economist alissa.lefebre@ing.com

#### Deepali Bhargava

Regional Head of Research, Asia-Pacific <u>Deepali.Bhargava@ing.com</u>

#### **Ruben Dewitte**

Economist +32495364780 ruben.dewitte@ing.com

Kinga Havasi Economic research trainee <u>kinga.havasi@ing.com</u>

#### Marten van Garderen

Consumer Economist, Netherlands marten.van.garderen@ing.com

#### David Havrlant

Chief Economist, Czech Republic 420 770 321 486 <u>david.havrlant@ing.com</u>

#### Sander Burgers

Senior Economist, Dutch Housing sander.burgers@ing.com

#### Lynn Song

Chief Economist, Greater China <u>lynn.song@asia.ing.com</u>

Michiel Tukker Senior European Rates Strategist michiel.tukker@ing.com Michal Rubaszek Senior Economist, Poland michal.rubaszek@ing.pl

#### This is a test author

**Stefan Posea** Economist, Romania <u>tiberiu-stefan.posea@ing.com</u>

Marine Leleux Sector Strategist, Financials marine.leleux2@ing.com

#### Jesse Norcross

Senior Sector Strategist, Real Estate jesse.norcross@ing.com

**Teise Stellema** Research Assistant, Energy Transition <u>teise.stellema@ing.com</u>

**Diederik Stadig** Sector Economist, TMT & Healthcare <u>diederik.stadig@ing.com</u>

**Diogo Gouveia** Sector Economist

diogo.duarte.vieira.de.gouveia@ing.com

Marine Leleux Sector Strategist, Financials marine.leleux2@ing.com

**Ewa Manthey** Commodities Strategist <u>ewa.manthey@ing.com</u>

**ING Analysts** 

James Wilson EM Sovereign Strategist James.wilson@ing.com

Sophie Smith Digital Editor

#### sophie.smith@ing.com

#### Frantisek Taborsky

EMEA FX & FI Strategist <u>frantisek.taborsky@ing.com</u>

#### Adam Antoniak

Senior Economist, Poland adam.antoniak@ing.pl

#### Min Joo Kang

Senior Economist, South Korea and Japan min.joo.kang@asia.ing.com

#### Coco Zhang

ESG Research <u>coco.zhang@ing.com</u>

#### Jan Frederik Slijkerman

Senior Sector Strategist, TMT jan.frederik.slijkerman@ing.com

#### Katinka Jongkind

Senior Economist, Services and Leisure Katinka.Jongkind@ing.com

#### Marina Le Blanc

Sector Strategist, Financials Marina.Le.Blanc@ing.com

#### Samuel Abettan

Junior Economist samuel.abettan@ing.com

#### Franziska Biehl Senior Economist, Germany Franziska.Marie.Biehl@ing.de

#### **Rebecca Byrne** Senior Editor and Supervisory Analyst <u>rebecca.byrne@ing.com</u>

#### Mirjam Bani

Sector Economist, Commercial Real Estate & Public Sector (Netherlands) <u>mirjam.bani@ing.com</u>

#### **Timothy Rahill** Credit Strategist

#### timothy.rahill@ing.com

#### Leszek Kasek

Senior Economist, Poland leszek.kasek@ing.pl

Oleksiy Soroka, CFA Senior High Yield Credit Strategist oleksiy.soroka@ing.com

Antoine Bouvet Head of European Rates Strategy antoine.bouvet@ing.com

#### Jeroen van den Broek

Global Head of Sector Research jeroen.van.den.broek@ing.com

#### Edse Dantuma

Senior Sector Economist, Industry and Healthcare edse.dantuma@ing.com

Francesco Pesole FX Strategist francesco.pesole@ing.com

**Rico Luman** Senior Sector Economist, Transport and Logistics <u>Rico.Luman@ing.com</u>

#### Jurjen Witteveen Sector Economist jurjen.witteveen@ing.com

Dmitry Dolgin Chief Economist, CIS dmitry.dolgin@ing.de

#### Nicholas Mapa

Senior Economist, Philippines nicholas.antonio.mapa@asia.ing.com

#### Egor Fedorov Senior Credit Analyst egor.fedorov@ing.com

Sebastian Franke Consumer Economist

#### sebastian.franke@ing.de

Gerben Hieminga Senior Sector Economist, Energy gerben.hieminga@ing.com

Nadège Tillier Head of Corporates Sector Strategy nadege.tillier@ing.com

Charlotte de Montpellier Senior Economist, France and Switzerland <u>charlotte.de.montpellier@ing.com</u>

Laura Straeter Behavioural Scientist +31(0)611172684 laura.Straeter@ing.com

Valentin Tataru Chief Economist, Romania valentin.tataru@ing.com

James Smith Developed Markets Economist, UK james.smith@ing.com

Senior Sector Strategist, Financials suvi.platerink-kosonen@ing.com

Thijs Geijer Senior Sector Economist, Food & Agri thijs.geijer@ing.com

Maurice van Sante Senior Economist Construction & Team Lead Sectors <u>maurice.van.sante@ing.com</u>

Marcel Klok Senior Economist, Netherlands <u>marcel.klok@ing.com</u>

Piotr Poplawski Senior Economist, Poland piotr.poplawski@ing.pl

Paolo Pizzoli

Senior Economist, Italy, Greece paolo.pizzoli@ing.com

Marieke Blom Chief Economist and Global Head of Research <u>marieke.blom@ing.com</u>

Raoul Leering Senior Macro Economist raoul.leering@ing.com

Maarten Leen Head of Global IFRS9 ME Scenarios maarten.leen@ing.com

Maureen Schuller

Head of Financials Sector Strategy <u>Maureen.Schuller@ing.com</u>

Warren Patterson Head of Commodities Strategy Warren.Patterson@asia.ing.com

Rafal Benecki Chief Economist, Poland rafal.benecki@ing.pl

Philippe Ledent Senior Economist, Belgium, Luxembourg philippe.ledent@ing.com

Peter Virovacz Senior Economist, Hungary peter.virovacz@ing.com

Inga Fechner Senior Economist, Germany, Global Trade inga.fechner@ing.de

**Dimitry Fleming** Senior Data Analyst, Netherlands <u>Dimitry.Fleming@ing.com</u>

**Ciprian Dascalu** Chief Economist, Romania +40 31 406 8990 <u>ciprian.dascalu@ing.com</u> Muhammet Mercan Chief Economist, Turkey muhammet.mercan@ingbank.com.tr

#### Iris Pang Chief Economist, Greater China iris.pang@asia.ing.com

Sophie Freeman Writer, Group Research +44 20 7767 6209 Sophie.Freeman@uk.ing.com

Padhraic Garvey, CFA Regional Head of Research, Americas padhraic.garvey@ing.com

James Knightley Chief International Economist, US james.knightley@ing.com

Tim Condon Asia Chief Economist +65 6232-6020

#### Martin van Vliet

Senior Interest Rate Strategist +31 20 563 8801 <u>martin.van.vliet@ing.com</u>

#### **Karol Pogorzelski** Senior Economist, Poland

Karol.Pogorzelski@ing.pl

## Carsten Brzeski

Global Head of Macro carsten.brzeski@ing.de

Viraj Patel

Foreign Exchange Strategist +44 20 7767 6405 viraj.patel@ing.com

#### **Owen Thomas**

Global Head of Editorial Content +44 (0) 207 767 5331 <u>owen.thomas@ing.com</u> Bert Colijn Chief Economist, Netherlands bert.colijn@ing.com

#### Peter Vanden Houte

Chief Economist, Belgium, Luxembourg, Eurozone <a href="mailto:peter.vandenhoute@ing.com">peter.vandenhoute@ing.com</a>

# Benjamin Schroeder

Senior Rates Strategist <u>benjamin.schroder@ing.com</u>

#### Chris Turner

Global Head of Markets and Regional Head of Research for UK & CEE <u>chris.turner@ing.com</u>

#### Gustavo Rangel

Chief Economist, LATAM +1 646 424 6464 gustavo.rangel@ing.com

#### Carlo Cocuzzo

Economist, Digital Finance +44 20 7767 5306 <u>carlo.cocuzzo@ing.com</u>